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WHY INFORMED CONSENT?
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION AND
THE ETHICS OF AUTONOMY
RICHARD W. GARNETT*
Any man's death diminishes me,
because I am involved in mankind;
and therefore never send to know
for whom the bell tolls;
it tolls for thee.'
A familiar figure ... haunts modern society.
We've never actually met him, but we all know him.
This elusive figure is the free agent, bound only by his
own choices. He chooses a career, a spouse, a religion, a
lifestyle, and more. He animates our moral and political
arguments, our very idea of what a person is, and our
social lives. A figure at once profound and banal,
he poses a host of intriguing puzzles.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Not long ago, the welfare reform debate took a provocative
Law Clerk to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Judge Richard S. Arnold;
B.A. Duke, 1990; J.D. Yale, 1995. The author thanks Professors Joseph Goldstein
and Robert Burt for their insight and inspiriation, and thanks Carl Allen and Nicole
Stelle Garnett for their patience, comments, and assistance. The opinions expressed
in this essay are not those of Chief Justice Rehnquist or Judge Arnold. This essay
won Yale Law School's 1995 Margaret Gruter Prize for the best paper in bioethics.
1J. Donne, Devotion XVII, in JOHN DONNE: SELECTED POETRY AND PROSE 166 (T.
Craik & R. Craik, eds. 1986).
2 DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY ix (1989).
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turn. New Jersey welfare recipients challenged the state's Fam-
ily Cap rule, which denied additional cash aid to parents who
conceive children while on welfare.3 Welfare rights activists ar-
gued that the rule "with[held] benefits to see if [this would] alter
human behavior."' They insisted that the innovative, but stern,
Family Cap rules were effectively experiments on welfare recipi-
ents without their consent.5
This is a powerful argument. After all, consent enjoys tal-
ismanic-if not sacramental-status in modem life and thought;
it is our "master concept."6 But why? Why should consenting
mean so much that by comparison other ideas and ideals often
mean so little?7 The power of consent lies deeper than its every-
day meaning of "Sure, go ahead" or "Let's do it."8 It prompts
more questions than it answers: May someone else say, "Sure, go
ahead. Do something to him?" If I consent to something now,
' C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D.N.J. 1995). The Family Cap provision
was challenged on the ground that, inter alia, it presented a danger to the plaintiffs'
well-being and therefore, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3515b, required their written con-
sent. Id. at 1008. The district court found that public benefit projects are generally
exempt from the informed consent requirement in that they do not present a danger
within the meaning of § 3515b. Id. at 1009; accord, Beno v. Shalala, 853 F. Supp.
1195, 1210 (E.D. Cal. 1993) ("as a general rule a project which changes benefit levels
will not present a danger such that informed consent is required"), rev'd on other
grounds, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994).
See Rats: Welfare Reform and Human Experimentation, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Aug. 8, 1994, at 16.
' Id. See C.K, 883 F. Supp. at 1008-09 (deeming New Jersey's Family Cap provi-
sion a "welfare experiment"); see also Beno, 853 F. Supp. at 1208 (finding that Cali-
fornia's work incentive program modifying benefits to welfare recipients is
"federally-funded 'experiment").
' Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900 (1994)
(discussing consent's role in law of contracts, torts, and health care treatment); see
also Richard A. Posner, Colloquy, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to
Professor West, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1431, 1431 (1986) (arguing that consent is "the
fundamental tenet of classical liberalism"); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference
with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1129 (1986) (noting that
"American law generally treats private preferences as the appropriate basis for so-
cial choice.").
7 See Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the
Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV.
384, 386 (1985) ("Consent insulates these situations from moral criticism and ren-
ders them, without more, morally attractive ... [C]onsent is a moral trump.").
' When asked if he had any last words, convicted murderer Gary Gilmore is re-
ported to have said, "Let's do it." NORMAN MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG 984
(1979). Mailer's account of Gilmore's fight to waive review of his death sentence - to
consent to his execution - dramatically illustrates the power of consent in our cul-
ture's imagination. Id.
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am I forever stuck with or bound by my choice? May I delegate
my power to consent or assign my consent's moral force to some-
one else? May I consent to anything I wish? Can everybody
provide morally meaningful consent, or only those who possess
or exhibit autonomy (whatever that means)?9
Such questions have always prompted frustratingly inter-
minable discussion. But we continue to wrestle with them be-
cause consent and its mysteries have "an extraordinarily firm
hold on our imagination .... [Consent] provides perhaps the sin-
gle most prevalent paradigm structuring our thinking about law,
society, morality and politics." ° Consent also animates other
cherished but nebulous concepts. It is intimately connected to
our ideas of "liberty" (I may do what I choose to do, and may ref-
use to consent to actions in which I do not wish to be involved);
"equality" (we all get to consent); "autonomy" (I and only I may
make these choices and decisions); and "dignity" (I may make
these decisions because of who and what I am)."
Perhaps because consent is so embedded in our moral think-
ing, we put it to at least two different tasks. First, consent is a
basic and fundamental prerequisite of our political and social in-
stitutions and of our dealings with one another." We have lost
the premodern vision of the world as an organic whole, and so
consent, rather than nature or design, structures the coming to-
gether, binding together, and living together of modern master-
less men. 3 This side of consent animates the political "consent
9 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Essay, Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV.
875 (1994) (unpacking concept of autonomy and contrasting "descriptive" with
"ascriptive" autonomy.).
10 HERZOG, supra note 2, at 215 (describing consent theory as "a theory of a social
world whose individuals make their own choices."); see also Robert A. Burt, Democ-
racy, Equality, and the Death Penalty, XXXVI Nomos 80 (1994) (noting that the
"equality principle" at core of democratic political theory "requires freely given con-
sent as the basis of all political relations."); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1129
("American law generally treats private preferences as the appropriate basis for so-
cial choice.").
" Peter Schuck has noted that consent expresses the "primacy of individualistic
values in our culture." It is "instrumental to economic efficiency, a cherished value
in American culture," and it animates our pervasive "suspicion of state power."
Schuck, supra note 6, at 900-01.
See generally supra note 6 and accompanying text.
3 HERZOG, supra note 2, at xiii, 39-71 ("Medieval images of society as an organic
whole ... were increasingly unhelpful .... Consent theory posed, correctly, not just
as a rival view, but as a superior one."). For a beautiful description of the medieval
vision, see C.S. LEWIS, THE DISCARDED IMAGE (1964).
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theory" and permeates the rhetoric and myths of the American
founding. 4 It is a necessary first condition for the legitimacy of
the institution or end-state that proceeds from the act of consent-
ing. 
5
Consent has another job. The fact that a certain institution,
result, procedure, or transaction was consented to is often
pointed to as the moral justification for that institution, result,
procedure, or transaction. Thus, not only is consent necessary
for a moral end-state, it is also sufficient. 16 Consent not only le-
gitimates, it also justifies. Not surprisingly, this is the face of
consent that resonates with libertarians and libertines.17
This "justifying" side of consent raises some timeless and
thorny questions. What if people consent to activities and re-
sults which are repugnant, or even evil? Even John Stuart Mill
worried about honoring consensual slavery.8 For Mill, one who
enslaved himself failed to play by the rules, "missed the point" of
his freedom, and could therefore be restrained without disrespect
to Liberty. Today, we wonder whether a woman's consent to ap-
pear in graphic, demeaning, or even violent pornography justifies
or immunizes the pornographer. 9 If she appears to consent to a
relationship in which she is repeatedly brutalized, does her con-
sent stymie our efforts to stop the brutality or punish the
brute?0
See generally HERZOG, supra note 2, at xiv, 5-38.
'5 See RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 144 (1981) ("One can justify
the state by imagining its formation as the product of a social contract, or one can
explain it as the actual product of such a contract.").
16 Id.
17 See HERZOG supra note 2, at 233 ("In a libertarian world, contract emerges as
the paradigm conception of what consent or choice amounts to."); see also ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) (discussing nature of state and its le-
gitimate functions and justifications).
" See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 125-26 (Oxford University Press 1948) (1859).
'9 See Jeffrey D. Goldberg, Comment, Involuntary Servitudes: A Property-Based
Notion of Abortion-Choice, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1597, 1634 n.134 (1991) ("Consider ...
some women's 'consent' to society's objectification and subordination of women
through the use of pornography.").
20 Id. ("Consider ... the 'consent' of battered women to stay with their assailants.
Similar questions involve the extent to which male-dominated institutions impose
cultural 'norms' that are then 'consented' to.").
Wives submit to abusive husbands; employees consent to exploitative and
humiliating work environments; consumers consent to sales of defective,
dangerous, and over-priced merchandise; women consent to 'date rape' and
to sexual harassment on the street and on the job; religious converts sub-
mit to directives compelling consensual suicide; subjects in an experiment
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These problems make us squirm a little, just as they did
Mill. We have three ways out: We can say, first, "Yes, consent
justifies whatever is consented to-you consented, so case
closed;" second, "This particular consent is deficient-you did not
really consent and so the result or action is not justified;" or
third, "You consented, but your consent cannot justify this action
or result." For example, Dr. Kevorkian apparently elicits con-
sent from his subjects before helping them kill themselves.2 We
can note the consent, shrug, and be on our way. Or, we can de-
construct the consent, scrutinizing it carefully for the indicia of
autonomy-was it "knowing?," was it "informed?"-that give
consent its moral force. Finally, we can say that while consent is
not irrelevant (it would certainly be worse if Dr. Kevorkian's
subjects did not consent), the consent does not and cannot justify
either Dr. Kevorkian's act or the act of his subject."
Note the subtle yet crucial difference between these three
options: In the first, consent is king, while the third option as-
sumes a moral universe shaped and governed by extra-
consensual considerations. The second option, however, reflects
the tension between the other two. We might block the con-
consent to the dehumanizing, authoritative instruction to electrically shock
other human beings; monks consensually abide by 'vows' of poverty; Zen
students consensually endure assaults by their teachers; patients in ther-
apy abide the directives of their therapists; soldiers follow the orders of
their superiors; and citizens generally obey, without need of coercion, the
legal injunctions of their governments.
West, supra note 7, at 427.
21 See generally Hon. Alice Gilbert, The Legal Response to Assisted Suicide, 20
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 673 (1994) (discussing legal response to physician-assisted sui-
cide and including Judge Gilbert's unpublished opinion issuing permanent injunc-
tion prohibiting Dr. Jack Kevorkian from engaging in further assisted suicides).
As this essay goes to publication, the United States Supreme Court is deciding
whether to join the national tumult over physician-assisted suicide. See Compassion
in Dying v. State of Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding
state's ban on physician-assisted suicide violated terminally ill patients' due process
rights); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2nd Cir. 1996) (holding New York's statute
criminalizing assisting another in committing suicide violated Equal Protection
Clause of U.S. Constitution).
22 See Susan K Jezewski, Note, Can a Suicide Machine Trigger the Murder Stat-
ute?, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1921, 1329 (1991) ("Under the traditional common law, con-
sent by the victim was never a defense to a murder charge, regardless of the intent
of the victim."); see also Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting
with Human Subjects, 98 DAEDALuS 219, 233 (1969) (consent is a "non-negotiable
minimum requirement" in human experimentation, but "not the full answer to the
problem"); West, supra note 7, at 399 (noting that consent "may save ... transactions
from being theft, slavery, or rape, but it hardly accords them positive moral value.
Consensual acts ... are not morally good simply because they are not coerced.").
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sented-to action, but we pay lip service to consent's justifying
role by assuring ourselves that had the consent been untainted,
had it been "informed," it would have had moral force. In fact,
we pay lip service precisely because we often silently suspect
that consent cannot and does not always justify." Therefore, in
difficult situations, we declare that the decision maker did not or
could not really consent, that the consent was not "informed" or
"knowing" or "voluntary."2 4 Rather than admit that the consent
does not and could not justify the act, we denigrate the consent
and, necessarily, the consenter as well.25
This is cheating; it is a subterfuge designed to hide our un-
ease and to allow us to profess simultaneous commitment to val-
ues that often conflict.2" This Article will discuss this subterfuge
in the context of experimentation and research on human be-
ings.27 First, to set the stage, I will briefly discuss human ex-
perimentation, its history, and the role of consent in research
ethics and regulations. Next, I will show how consent has failed
to control abuses in human experimentation, and how it has ac-
tually undermined the dignity of research subjects by decon-
structing their ability to make decisions. Finally, I will argue
that consent cannot justify all experiments. Consent, and the
ethics of autonomy its prominence reflects, is not up to the task
we have assigned it. I conclude with some thoughts on an ethics
of relationships, one grounded in a more robust conception of
human flourishing and telos, which may better promote and pro-
tect our ideals in human experimentation.
There are powerful objections to this argument. First, we
need research subjects, and limits on consent hamstring both
Science and Progress.28 This may be a price worth paying. After
23 See Robin West, Colloquy, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge
Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1449-50 (1986) (arguing that readers would not be-
lieve that people should be allowed to sell themselves into slavery or prostitution).
24 See infra part IV.
25 Id.
"' On the use of subterfuge as a device for masking trade-offs between competing
values, see GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES 195-99 (1978).
27 Guido Calabresi has observed that consent plays two distinct roles in human
experimentation. See Guido Calabresi, Reflections on Medical Experimentation in
Humans, 98 DAEDALUS 387,403-05 (1969).
28 See Jesse A. Goldner, An Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experimenta-
tion and the Regulatory Implication of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST.
Louis. U. L.J. 63 (1993) (discussing effect of regulatory scheme controlling human
experimentation); Tim Friend, Divided Over Devices: FDA Rules Force Medical Test
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all, "progress is an optional goal, not an unconditional commit-
ment ... its tempo in particular, compulsive as it may become,
has nothing sacred about it." 9 Second, it is charged, limits on a
potential subject's power to consent to an experiment are inde-
fensibly and offensively paternalistic." Both the legitimating
and justifying faces of consent purportedly embody and advance
notions of freedom and autonomy.3 By curtailing consent's jus-
tificatory role, do we trample on human dignity? Maybe not.
The same concern and respect for human dignity that animates
and empowers consent may also require restrictions upon the
unbridled search for knowledge; it may-perhaps paradoxical-
ly-preclude unlimited autonomy.
Returning to the question posed at the outset: Why does
consent have such moral power? Accept for now that our defer-
ence to consent is-perhaps mistakenly-rooted in a commit-
ment to human dignity, expressed through respect for
autonomy." Is consent's justifying role necessarily required by
this commitment to human dignity? Why have we come to think
that it is? Does our dignity as persons follow from, or does it in-
stead create and condition, our autonomy? Do we respect con-
sent because one feature of our dignity is that we always know
what is best for us? Clearly we do not:
Free individuals, going about their own business with dignity
and confidence: that's what the world is all about, we think ...
We are uneasily aware that the world isn't quite like that after
all ... we make horrible choices all the time. Our actions are of-
ten uninformed, self-destructive, neurotically repetitive, floun-
dering and helpless."
Perhaps, instead, the full brunt of the evil of which we are
capable-so evident in this century of ghettoes, concentration
camps, killing fields, cultural revolution, eugenics, and ethnic
cleansing-coupled with the modern vision of human society as
an aggregate of atomistic individuals rather than an organic
Overseas, Clinical Trials in U.S. Called 'Endangered,' USA TODAY, May 10, 1995, at
Al (explaining that before medical devices are tested in humans, Food and Drug
Administration requires that risky devices be proven safe in laboratory testing).
29 Jonas, supra note 22, at 245.
30 See infra notes 195-226 and accompanying text.
31 See West, supra note 7, at 411-12 (noting "gross disjunction between consensual
acceptance of risk and the autonomous values that consent purportedly promotes").32 See Schuck, supra note 6, at 939 (noting that deontological view of consent as
promoting human autonomy has driven traditional doctrine of informed consent).
33 HERZOG, supra note 2, at 2.
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whole, has left us standing bare and exposed, with no reply to or
protection from such atrocities other than a weak and hollow in-
sistence that, in the future, "we must consent first!" 4 The pres-
ence of consent has thus become the assurance to ourselves that
all is well. It is a marker which-we hope-indicates acceptable
human relations.35 But of course it does not, and so our reliance
on consent is all the more poignant a subterfuge.36 If consent's
power to justify derives from a weary reaction to evil in an
overly-individualistic world, and not from a commitment to social
relations predicated on respect for human dignity, we are
doomed to disappointment, and we have failed as a community.
II. HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION AND WHY WE SHOULD WORRY
ABOUT IT
A. An Uneasy History
We harbor a deeply-rooted, but rarely articulated, unease
with human experimentation.37 During the past few years, con-
troversy has drawn this unease to the surface of public life.38 For
example, in the recent debate over experimentation on made-for-
' The Nuremberg Tribunal decried the fact that "[iln every single instance ...
subjects were used who did not consent," as if the lack of consent was what made
the Nazi Doctors' actions so horrible. See United States v. Karl Brandt, et al., in
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND PROCESS 66, 74 (1974)
[hereinafter CRIMINAL LAW].
5 I was given this insight by Professor Robert Burt.
3' See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 26, at 195-99 ("[It will become apparent
that some sacrifice of values has taken place.").
37 See CHARLOTTE LEVY, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAW: LEGAL & ETHICAL
CONSIDERATIONS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 1 (2d ed. 1983) ("[S]ome people bris-
tle at the very idea of experimenting with human beings and they are not willing to
discuss it further.").
3' See, e.g., Michael Granberry, UC Irvine Unveils Plan for Closer Policing of Re-
search on Humans, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1996, at A3 (describing university's new
measures designed to prevent abusive and scandalous experiments); Julianne
Malveauz, Experiments Are Barbaric, USA TODAY, Nov. 13, 1995, at A12 (arguing
against human experimentation); Little Harm Found in Radiation Tests: Study Says
Most Subjects Shouldn't Get Compensation, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 3, 1995, at 3 (reporting
advisory panel's finding that most people subjected to government-sanctioned ra-
diation tests during Cold War suffered little or no lasting effect); see also President
William J. Clinton, Executive Order, Protection of Human Research Subjects and
Creation of National Bioethics Advisory Commission (Oct. 3, 1995); E. Cooper
Brown, Human Radiation Experiments: Statement of the Task Force on Radiation
and Human Rights on the 50th Anniversary of the Nuremberg Tribunal
(Congressional Testimony, March 12, 1996).
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research embryos, one objector expressed horror at such
"Frankensteinian" projects; his opponent rejoined that the re-
search "could spare enormous human suffering and help count-
less Americans."39 A New York Times editorial joined the fray,
proclaiming that "humans are not lettuces" to be created and
discarded for purely instrumental purposes. ° Dr. Jack Kev-
orkian has stirred up still more controversy by advocating ex-
tensive experimentation on anesthetized capital offenders, and
by his recent acquittals on murder charges.4' The Clinton ad-
ministration investigated experiments at Vanderbilt University
in the 1940's in which pregnant women were given radioactive
iron.42  A UCLA undergraduate who volunteered for experi-
Kim Painter, Scientists' Existential Question, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 1994, at Dl-
2 (discussing morality of experimentation on human embryos); see also Laurie
McGinley, Research That Uses Human Embryos Should Get U.S. Funding, Panel
Says, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1994, at B7 (describing federal advisory panel's recom-
mendation that researchers be allowed to produce embryos specifically for research);
Richard John Neuhaus, Don't Cross This Threshold, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1994, at
A20 (cautioning against crossing threshold into embryo experimentation); Joseph
Piccione, Close This Box of Horrors, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 1994, at A10 (warning
that embryo research will open "Pandora's box of horrors and ... future dilemmas
that will in turn sacrifice good ethics to cold utilitarian standards."); Clinton Bars
Certain Funding of Embryos, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1994, at B5 (reporting President's
barring of federal funding for research on embryos created solely for research pur-
poses); Restart Embryo Research, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 1994, at A10 (noting that
"microscopic cluster of human cells holds a treasure-trove."); Letters to the Editor,
When is an Embryo Human?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1994, at All (responding to
Neuhaus by arguing that human life does not begin at conception).
Arthur H. Rotstein, Ban on Fetal-Tissue Research Challenged: Parkinson's Pa-
tients Among Suit's Plaintiffs, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, April 30, 1996, at B1 (describing
lawsuit against statute criminalizing experimentation on aborted unborn children);
Mary Cantwell, Should We Make Research Embryos? No, Humans Are Not Lettuces,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1994, at A36 (criticizing proposal allowing scientists to use
human embryos for research purposes); but see Philip M. Boffey, An Editorial De-
bate: Should We Make Research Embryos?; Yes, the Gains Could Be Great, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 1994, at A36 (arguing that research embryos hold potential for
great benefit).
41 See generally JACK KEVORKIAN, PRESCRIPTION: MEDICINE - THE GOODNESS OF
PLANNED DEATH (1991); Mark Hosenball, The Real Jack Kevorkian, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 6, 1993, at 28 ("Kevorkian advocated what he calls 'terminal human experi-
mentation.'"); Brian Harmon, Is He a Freedom Fighter or a Ghoulish Dr. Death?,
DETROIT NEWS, May 23, 1996 (describing public opinion and reaction regarding
Kevorkian's acquittals and activities); Edward Walsh, Kevorkian Critics Left With
Dilemma; Legal System Failing to Halt Suicides, WASH. POST, May 18, 1996, at A3
(discussing impact of Kevorkian acquittals on future cases and legislation).
" Clinton Apologizes for the Wrong Done in Human Radiation Testing, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 4, 1995, at 9 ("When the government does wrong, we have a moral responsibil-
ity to admit it."); see Keith Schneider, Scientists Share in Pain of Experiment De-
bates, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1994, at A12 ("No institution has developed a tougher
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mental schizophrenia treatment has alleged that researchers
foresaw and even conspired to produce his and others' schizo-
phrenic relapses. 4'3 Researchers, ethicists, and activists continue
to debate limits on testing experimental AIDS drugs." And in
the Persian Gulf War, unknowing soldiers were given unproved
drugs and vaccines."
But the recent surge in awareness and discussion about hu-
stance than Vanderbilt University which contends that its scientists did nothing
wrong when they recruited at least 819 pregnant women ... for a nutritional
study."). The results of the radation experiment investigation, which have angered
many, found that "only a few hundred people should get medical notification, com-
pensation, or even a personal apology from the federal government." See Danielle
Gordon, The Verdict: No Harm No Foul. Report of the Advisory Committee on Hu-
man Radiation Experiments, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, January, 1996, at
32.
41 See James Willwerth, Tinkering with Madness, TIME, Aug. 30, 1993, at 40
("Today Greg's parents believe the doctors deliberately triggered his relapse."); see
also Joy Horowitz, For the Sake of Science, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 11, 1994, at
16 (suicide of schizophrenic UCLA research patient set off national debate on hu-
man experimentation); Agency Faults a UCLA Study for Suffering of Mental Pa-
tients, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1994, at Al ("[Tihe study ... raised fundamental
questions about the system for protecting patients in medical experiments.").
"See generally George J. Annas, Faith (Healing), Hope and Charity at the F.D.A.:
The Politics of AIDS Drug Trials, 34 VILL. L. REV. 771 (1989) [hereinafter Annas,
Faith] (arguing that distinction between experimental and therapeutic interventions
is crucial to science and individual rights); Martin Delaney, The Case for Patient Ac-
cess to Experimental Therapy, 159 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 416 (1989) (answering
arguments used to justify denial of access to experimental therapy); Wendy K.
Mariner, AIDS Research and the Nuremberg Code, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE
NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 286-304 (George
J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992) [hereinafter THE NAZI DOCTORS] (detailing
controversy over human research for new drugs for AIDS).
41 In December, 1990, the FDA granted the Department of Defense a waiver from
human experimentation regulations, and allowed the use of unapproved drugs and
vaccines on soldiers in the Persian Gulf. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 23(d) (1995). The
Commissioner of Food and Drugs may determine that obtaining informed consent is
not feasible in specific military operations involving combat or immediate threat of
combat. See generally George J. Annas, Mengele's Birthmark: The Nuremberg Code
in United States Courts, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 17 (1991) [hereinafter
Annas, Mengele's Birthmark]; George Annas & Michael Grodin, Treating the Troops,
21 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 24 (1991). A federal court refused to enjoin implementation
of the rule. See Doe v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that FDA's
rule allowing Department of Defense to administer unapproved drugs to troops
participating in Operation Desert Storm without obtaining informed consent consti-
tuted strategic military decision, advanced legitimate government interests, and did
not violate due process rights), affd, 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991). But see Martha
J. Burns, Note, They Fight to Protect Our Rights; Shouldn't We Do the Same for
Them? Intramilitary Immunity in Light of United States v. Stanley, 38 DEPAL L.
REV. 127 (1988) (criticizing Supreme Court's decision that there is military immu-
nity from suit based on lack of informed consent even in peacetime).
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man experimentation" should not obscure the fact that medicine
has a long "tinkering tradition."47 Twentieth-century conscious-
ness has been especially influenced by a few notorious experi-
ments,48 including the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, in which
hundreds of black men were allowed to languish with curable
syphilis;" the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital study, in which
researchers injected live cancer cells into unknowing patients
with various chronic debilitating diseases;" the experiments of
the Nazi doctors;5 and the recently publicized atrocities of the
Japanese Army's "Unit 731," which killed thousands of Chinese
in medical and germ-warfare experiments.52 In short, we have a
" See Keay Davidson, Radiation Inquiry Opens in S.F.; Panel Probes Secret Tests
on Humans, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Oct. 12, 1994, at A6 (revealing "nation's
legacy of radiation experiments on unwitting victims."); Tim Friend, Patients Not
Told Devices Experimental, USA TODAY, Apr. 19, 1995, at Al (disclosing that doc-
tors implanted experimental medical devices in patients without their knowledge in
violation of FDA testing rules); Philip J. Hilts, Judge Tells Health Department to
Stop Experiments on Patients, N.Y. TIMES, March 26, 1995, at B52 (reporting that
Health Department ordered to halt experiments on children and mentally ill who
are incompetent to give their consent); Philip J. Hilts, New Radiation Tests on Civil-
ians Disclosed; Panel Finds Another, Unanticipated Facet of Cold War Experiments:
Ethical Debates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1994, at A10 (reporting that Presidential
committee uncovered evidence of many previously unknown radiation experiments
during Cold War Era).
41 Robert A. Burt, Why We Should Keep Prisoners from the Doctors, 5 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 25, 26 (1975). On the history of human experimentation, see generally,
Annas, Mengele's Birthmark, supra note 45 (outlining recent history of human ex-
perimentation in United States); Henry K Beecher, Experimentation in Man, 169 J.
AMER. MED. ASS. 461 (1959); Norman Howard-Jones, Human Experimentation in
Historical and Ethical Perspectives, 16 SOC. SCI. MED. 1429, 1429-1435 (1982)
(detailing history of human experimentation through Thalidomide tragedy); A.C.
Ivy, The History and Ethics of the Use of Human Subjects in Medical Experiments,
108 SCIENCE 1, 1-2 (1948) (detailing history of human experimentation from Hippo-
crates to Hitler).
See George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin, Introduction, in THE NAzI DOCTORS,
supra note 44, at 3, 6 (noting role of abuses in guiding thinking about research).
49 See generally ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL
RESEARCH 51-52 (1981) (subjects of Tuskegee Syphilis Study were recruited without
their informed consent and were not subsequently informed that penicillin had be-
come available for treatment of syphilis).
'o See generally JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 9-65 (1972)
[hereinafter EXPERIMENTATION] (subjects of Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital study
were chronically ill and debilitated patients injected without informed consent).
" For a collection of essays on the Nazi Doctors' case and its impact on medical
research, see generally EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 50, at 292-305 (collecting oral
arguments and testimony); THE NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 44.
"2 Doctors and soldiers with "Unit 731" dissected live prisoners, dropped "plague
bombs" on entire villages, gassed mothers and children while timing their convul-
sions, and pickled humans in six-foot jars of formaldehyde. George J. Annas & Mi-
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long history of human experimentation, and just as long a his-
tory of abusing it.
53
B. Is Our Unease Justified?
Maybe this historical sketch is overly tendentious, a bit over-
done? After all, conscientious doctors experiment on humans
under strict regulations, laws, and guidelines all the time.
Clearly, most innovative therapy and research has nothing to do
with the spooky deeds of Frankensteinian bogeymen or war
criminals. But we should not rest too easy. Although we intui-
tively distinguish creative therapy from troubling experimenta-
tion-we know it when we see it-the line is not clear. 4  As
Professor George Annas has argued, many "breakthrough" pro-
cedures which purported to be therapeutic triumphs-temporary
artificial hearts, baboon hearts, organ transplants-were in fact
blatant, experimental exploitations of desperate people.55 What
chael A. Grodin, Where Do We Go From Here, in THE NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 44,
at 310. The experimenters were never prosecuted because the United States
granted immunity in exchange for the research data. Id.; see Nicholas D. Kristoff,
Japan Confronting Gruesome War Atrocity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1995, at Al
(detailing research program which had prisoners deliberately infected with plague);
The Crimes of Unit 731, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1995, at A22 (editorializing that some
of World War II's greatest atrocities were committed by Japanese Army).
4' See generally Henry K Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1354 (1966) (gathering data on dozens of unethical clinical experiments);
David J. Rothman, Ethics and Human Experimentation: Henry Beecher Revisited,
317 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1195 (1987) (following up on Beecher's work and comment-
ing on changes in experimentation and regulation since).
Robert Levine has rejected the term "experimentation" altogether, along with
"therapeutic research" and "nontherapeutic research." LEVINE, supra note 49, at 6-
8. However, in so doing, Levine loses the entirely legitimate moral and historical
baggage the word "experimentation" carries. For purposes of this paper,
"experimentation" denotes any practice, act, or procedure whose primary purpose is
other than the benefit of the subject of that practice, act, or procedure.
Jay Katz, in his casebook, deliberately refrained from drawing "hard and fast
lines between interventions for 'the acquisition of knowledge' or for the 'subject's
benefit' so as to leave open the question whether the authority assigned to the par-
ticipants, and any restrictions imposed upon them, in one setting should apply
equally to the other." EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 50, at 3.
Hans Jonas has also adopted the distinction between research done for the pa-
tient's benefit, which is permissible, and research in which the patient is exploited.
See Jonas, supra note 22, at 242.
As Joseph Goldstein has noted, the line between permissible research and crime
is not as clear as we might like to think. See CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 34, at 65-66
(discussing research as "defense").
" See generally GEORGE J. ANNAS, JUDGING MEDICINE (1988) [hereinafter
JUDGING MEDICINE).
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is today standard therapy may rest on an unsightly history of
overreaching.
Still, we need research; wrestling with its problems and en-
during the pain of compromise may be the price we have to pay.5"
Perhaps dubious practices are justified by their necessity, their
usefulness, and their contribution to the common good. 7 As
Justice Frankfurter once wrote:
For society's good-if understanding be an essential need of so-
ciety-inquiries into these problems, speculations about them,
stimulation in others of reflection upon them, must be left as
unfettered as possible.'
But it is not enough to invoke the "common good"59 or to say
that experimentation is useful or necessary. Useful or necessary
for what? Whose needs and interests justify experimentation?
The subject's, society's, or the researcher's?' How far may we
go? Will we know when we have crossed the line from solving
real problems and satisfying real needs to modernity's misplaced
and dangerous perfectionism?61 Will we be able to affirm per-
"8 See Calabresi, supra note 27, at 388-89 (noting "deep conflict" between our
commitments to dignity and human life and to material progress); Louis Lasagna,
Special Subjects in Human Experimentation, 98 DAEDALUS 449, 460-61 (1969)
(noting that human experimentation is necessary for medical progress, but that
some gains may only be available at a price we are unwilling to pay).
" In Dr. Henry Beecher's Report to the A.M.A. Council on Drugs, he observed that
"it is clearly evident that human experimentation is necessary for the welfare of the
race, for in medical research lies 'a common benefit not obtainable by other means.'"
Beecher, supra note 47, at 463. He warned, however, that in light of "the recent
Hitlerian acts," we are rightly wary of phrases like "for the good of society." Id. at
463.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring).
'9 See Pope Pius XII, An Address to the First International Congress on the Histo-
pathology of the Nervous System, in CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 34, at 91, 93 (noting
limited moral claims of common good).
60 See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 151 (1984)
(physicians claim to respond to patients' needs when planning treatment, but may
really be protecting or pursuing their own); see generally RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986) (describing
moral principles, rights, legal theories, and concepts of informed consent); Michael
D. Davidson, Note, First Amendment Protection for Biomedical Research, 19 ARIZ. L.
REV. 893 (1977) (discussing biomedical research as protected form of expression and
means of self-fulfillment for researchers).
6' See Annas, Mengele's Birthmark, supra note 45, at 18. Annas also notes, draw-
ing on Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Birthmark and Rappacini's Daughter, the recur-
ring "theme of the overreaching man attempting to control nature, with disastrous
results ..... Id.
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sonal dignity in the face of the medical ideology's tendency to
objectify the human subject?"2
Given these worries, our unease with experimentation seems
well-justified. Restraint is neither a modern nor medical virtue,
but here the protection of human dignity may require it. As Pro-
fessor Katz has commented:
[t]he history of experimentation with human beings also testi-
fies to the ubiquity of human aggression, however obscured by
physician-scientists' real and caring dedication to the alleviation
of mankind's pain and suffering from the ravages of disease ....
The violent authority that physicians can exercise is obscured
by the social organization of the caretaking institutions within
which they operate, as is the violence of judges who work within
the halls of justice. Many advances in medicine might have
been slower in coming had physician-investigators pursued
their clinical research less aggressively by not engineering con-
sent. Would it have been a price worth paying, even though the
suffering of future patients might have remained for a while
longer without relief?n
Warnings about abusive experiments seem shrill and para-
noid to those convinced that experimentation serves both social
ends and the personal fulfillment of scientists. 64  However, hu-
62 See Mario Biagioli, Science, Modernity, and the "Final Solution," in PROBING
THE LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION: NAZISM AND THE "FINAL SOLUTION" 185, 187 (Saul
Friedlander, ed. 1992) (noting that medicine's adoption of physical science methods
led to objectification and alienation); ROBERTA. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS:
RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIPS at 72-91 (1979) (discussing Mil-
gram Experiments and noting science's "depersonalized methodology" and
"mechanistic, objectively impersonal format which is the basic tenet of the scientific
view ....").
" Jay Katz, The Consent Principle of the Nuremberg Code: Its Significance Then
and Now, in THE NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 44, at 227, 238. See also CHARLES
FRIED, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION: PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND SOCIAL POLICY 168
(1974) (asking whether slowing of medical progress by limiting experimentation
might be price worth paying); Burt, supra note 10 (noting "special obligation of self-
restraint" which falls on majority in democracy committed to equal respect).
One researcher, recognizing that abuse may occur, points out that "despicable
examples of human research are hardly typical .... This does not excuse the horror
but it does call for perspective." Louis Lasagna, A Researcher's Perspective, in
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 21, 23 (Robert L. Bogomolny ed., 1976) [hereinafter
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION]. See also Richard J. Bonnie & P. Browning Hoffman,
Regulation of Human Experimentation: A Reappraisal of Informed Consent, in
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION, supra, at 52 (1976) (complaining that public "overreacts"
to research, and is critical rather than deferential to medical and scientific judg-
ment); Friend, supra note 28 (stating that Food and Drug Administration requires
laboratory showing that medical device is safe to be approved).
WHY INFORMED CONSENT?
man experimentation and its problems take us well beyond the
narrow realm of medical practice:
Human experimentation cannot be analyzed in isolation ... for
inherent in its dynamics are several ubiquitous forces which
shape all social interaction-man's quest for knowledge and
mastery, his willingness to risk human life, and his readiness to
delegate authority to professionals and to rely on their judg-
ment.
Our unease with research on humans therefore reflects more
than a Luddite mistrust of medicine. Because of our ubiquitous
curiosity, ambition, and concern, we will always want-and
think we need-to "tinker," to explore, to know,66 and often, to
exploit.
III. REGULATING HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION THROUGH CONSENT
A. The Nuremberg Code and "Informed Consent"
The Nuremberg Code67 and the memory of the Nazi doctors'
65 EXPERIMENTATION supra note 50, at 2; see also Annas & Grodin, supra note 48,
at 7 ("The theme of human rights in human experimentation is a universal one.").
" See, e.g., Genesis 3:1-6 (New King James) (Adam and Eve ate from Tree of
Knowledge of Good and Evil, seeking knowledge and desiring to be like God).
67 United States v. Brandt (case no. 1), I TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS 3 (1949), has
become known as the Medical Case because 20 of the 23 defendants were doctors
and the charges related primarily to human experimentation. See TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL LAW
No. 10 (Vols. 1 & 2 1949) (containing trial proceedings and judgements for Nazi doc-
tors case) [hereinafter TRIALS OF WAR]. The Nuremberg code was part of the judg-
ment handed down in the Medical Case. Id. See also Baruch A. Brady, Book Review,
When Physicians Go Wrong, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L. 503 (1995). The ten
principles of the code, infra, outline the moral and ethical obligations that a re-
search scientist must adhere to before beginning experimentation on human sub-
jects. The principles are as follows:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give
consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice,
without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress,
overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should
have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the sub-
ject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and en-
lightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance
of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be
made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment;
the method and means by which it is to be constructed; all inconveniences
and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or
person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.
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trial animate and permeate modern thinking about regulation of
human experimentation." The Code was our most morally rigor-
ous attempt to limit human experimentation."9 Its most memo-
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent
rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experi-
ment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated
to another with impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good
of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not ran-
dom and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of ani-
mal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the diseases
or other problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the
performance of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary
physical and mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to
believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those
experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by
the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experi-
ment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to
protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury,
disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified
persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through
all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experi-
ment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at
liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or
mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be im-
possible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be
prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable
cause to believe, in the exercise of good faith, superior skill, and careful
judgment required of him, that a continuation of the experiment is likely to
result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.
reprinted in THE NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 44, at 2.
68 See Annas & Grodin, supra note 48, at 3 ("[AIlI contemporary debate on human
experimentation is grounded in Nuremberg ... [t]he most important historical forum
for questioning the permissible limits of human experimentation."); Kathleen M.
O'Connor, Comment, OMB Involvement in FDA Drug Regulations: Regulating the
Regulators, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 175 (1988) (indicating Nuremberg Code is reflected
in modern regulations governing research). The Nuremberg Code has influenced
policy and law in the area of informed consent and provided the basis for United
States and foreign regulations governing the protection of human research subjects.
See VEATCH, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES IN MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION 21, 32-33 n.30 (A.
Rivlin & P.Timpane eds., 1975). The code also influenced the court's decision in
Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health. See infra notes 113-30 and accompa-
nying text.
69 'The Nuremberg Code was not the first code of human experimentation, nor
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rable command was that, in medical research, "[tihe voluntary
consent of the human subject is absolutely essential."70 But
while the Code has come to stand for "informed consent," it re-
quired more. It focused as much on the experiment itself, on the
welfare of the subject, and on the conduct of the researcher as it
did on the need for the subject's consent.71 Sadly, this broad fo-
cus has received relatively short shrift, and the consent principle
has eclipsed the others."
The Code stands tall in memory but its influence has never
lived up to its aims.7" Seen by many as a product of and reaction
was it the most comprehensive ... [It is, however,] the hallmark for all subsequent
discourse on the ethics of human experimentation." Michael A. Grodin, Historical
Origins of the Nuremberg Code, in THE NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 44, at 121, 122.
See generally HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 64, at 53 (indicating Code was
clearly meant to impose substantial burdens on medical research); GEORGE J.
ANNAS ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE SUBJECT'S
DILEMMA 6-9 (1977) (indicating Code was most comprehensive statement on human
experimentation and demanded full disclosure to subjects before their participa-
tion).
'0 See supra note 67 (principle 1); Leonard H. Glantz, The Influence of the Nurem-
berg Code on U.S. Statutes and Regulations, in THE NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 44,
at 183 (providing overview of Nuremberg Code's influence on United States experi-
mentation regulations).
71 For example, the code provided, "[tihe experiment should be such as to yield
fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other means of study, and
not random and unnecessary in nature," supra note 68 (Principle 2); "[tihe experi-
ment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experimentation and
a knowledge of the ... disease or other problem under study that the anticipated re-
sults will justify the performance of the experiment," id. (Principle 3); and "[tihe ex-
periment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons." Id. (Principle
8). See also George J. Annas & Michael A Grodin, Preface, in THE NAZI DOCTORS,
supra note 44 ("Discussions of human rights in human experimentation consistently
begin with the Nuremberg Code."); Glantz, supra note 70, at 184 (indicating Code
looks not only to rights of subjects, but to their welfare as well).
72 See Annas, Mengele's Birthmark, supra note 45, at 42 ("[The consent principle]
of the Nuremberg Code, although rarely cited, became the primary justification for
therapeutic experimentation. Much less attention was paid to the other nine prin-
ciples.").
13 "[The Code] has been criticized on a number of levels. Arguments have been put
forth that suggest that 'the Code, in an attempt to provide for all contingencies, un-
duly restricts the investigator by requiring him to anticipate and provide for every
situation and by demanding the impossible in some instances.'" Perley, et al., The
Nuremberg Code: An International Overview, in THE NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 44,
at 155 (citations omitted). The Code, by making "voluntary consent" an absolute re-
quirement, limits the populations upon which experimentation can be conducted. Id.
Adherence to principle 1 of the Code would effectively curtail the study of mental
illness and children's diseases because children and the mentally ill do not have the
legal capacity to give consent. Id. Other Principles of the Code have been criticized
for demanding too much from the researcher. See generally id. "A set of 'Universal
principles,' with no legal or professional authority, is successful only if researchers
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to Nazi terror, the Code is often dismissed as a context-bound
relic, no longer useful for today's researchers.74 Pragmatists ar-
gue that the Code is simply too demanding, that its standards
are too high for necessary research to meet,8 and that its abso-
lutism cannot compete with the utilitarian and impersonal ethics
of modern medicine. 6 How could the Code wane to a mere sym-
bol? It claimed, after all, roots in natural law," universal val-
ues,78 and the time-honored ethics of the medical profession.8  In
choose to abide by them." Id. at 157. The Code, despite having applicability in all
courts of the United States, is rarely cited. See Annas, Mengele's Birthmark, supra
note 45, at 21. For a detailed discussion of the effect of the Nuremburg Code, see
Panel Session, Forty Years After the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals: The Impact of
the War Crimes Trials on International and National Law, 80 AM. SOC. INT'L. L.
PROC. 56 (1986).
"' See Beeson et al., Panel Discussion, Moral Issues in Clinical Research, 36 YALE
J. BIOLOGY & MED. 455, 464 (1964) ("[The Code] is a wonderful document to say why
the war crimes were atrocities, but it is not a very good guide to clinical investiga-
tion which is done with high motives."); Katz, supra note 63, at 228 (indicating poli-
cymakers have viewed Code as response to isolated tragedy, unsuited to needs of
modem research).
" "The spirit of the Nuremberg Code was not, and perhaps could not, be taken
seriously. Its language was too uncompromising and too inhospitable to the ad-
vancement of science that subsequent codes reintroduced by giving physician-
scientists considerable discretion in pursuing their objective." Katz, supra note 63,
at 235.
76 George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin, Where Do We Go From Here? in THE
NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 44, at 307, 309-10.
[T]he efforts to marginalize the Code rest primarily on a failure of physi-
cians to take informed consent seriously and on a belief, perhaps a societal
one, that when it is impossible or difficult to obtain consent, ways to get
around this requirement should be found if the research is potentially im-
portant to society.
Id. See generally Annas, Mengele's Birthmark, supra note 45 (suggesting that man's
inherent instinct for self-preservation is used as justification for even brutal ex-
periments occurring after promulgation of Nuremberg Code).
" See Annas & Grodin, supra note 48, at 3 (commenting that Nuremberg Code is
attempt to capture natural law standard for practical and modern business of hu-
man experimentation); ANNAS ET AL., supra note 69, at 6 (stating that "[tihe basis of
the Code is a type of natural law reasoning.").
78 See Ruth Macklin, The Universality of the Nuremberg Code, in THE NAZI
DOCTORS, supra note 44, at 240, 244 (noting Code's roots in broad, Kantian princi-
ples which prohibit use of people as means to researcher's ends). The Code, in Ms.
Macklin's opinion, embodied an ethical ideal, one that is universally applicable. Id.
at 255. "All present and future research involving human subjects should comply
with this ideal ...." Id. See also Grodin, supra note 69, at 121 (suggesting that Tribu-
nal needed universal values grounded in history to condemn Nazis).
'9 Dr. Leo Alexander and Dr. Andrew Ivy, the prosecution's principal medical
ethics witnesses, attempted to connect the Code's principles with medical ethics
going as far back as the Hippocratic Oath. See Grodin, supra note 69, at 122-23;
Katz, supra note 63, at 228 (noting that Tribunal erroneously believed consent
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reality, the Code's drafters glossed over a long history of medical
complicity in questionable experiments. ° The Code reflected nei-
ther the practice nor the ideals of scientists, but only those of a
victorious and self-congratulatory moment, and therefore, never
really had a chance.
B. Regulating Experimentation After Nuremberg: The Standard
Model of Informed Consent
Since Nuremberg, other codes of ethics and research, regula-
tions, laws, and values have outpaced the Code's idealistic abso-
lutism. The new approaches strike a compromise between the
Code's idealism and the perceived need for more flexible, per-
missive, and perhaps realistic guidelines for research.8 For ex-
ample, the Helsinki Declaration of 1964, though it superficially
appears to take up the Code's torch, embodies vastly different
assumptions about research and experimentation.82 It promotes
principles of Code had always been embraced by medical profession). The Hippo-
cratic oath explicitly states that physicians "will follow that system of regimes which
according to [their] ability and judgment, [they] consider for the benefit of [their]
patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous." reprinted in
Grodin, supra note 69, at 123 (citations omitted). The Oath speaks of obligations to
patients and is silent about the subject of experimentation. See id. (comparing Code
to Hippocratic Oath).
80 The defense lawyers in the Nazi Doctors case emphasized that experimentation
on prisoners was common in the United States and that both the United States and
Great Britain had used data gleaned from Japanese wartime experiments. Macklin,
supra note 78, at 246-47. The "medical case" transcripts can be found reprinted in
TRIALS OF WAR, supra note 67.
8 See generally Annas & Grodin, supra note 76, at 307 ("[Tlhere has been a con-
sistent and insistent movement away from the directness of the Code toward more
flexible forms of judging the conduct of human experimentation."); Louis L. Jaffee,
Law as a System of Control, 98 Daedalus 406, 420-22 (1969) (noting wide range of
opinion as to importance of informed consent); Katz, supra note 63 (indicating mod-
ern research regulations are less rigid and demanding than Code).
812 The Declaration of Helsinki is more "liberal" than the Code on the issue of con-
sent. See Beth Brandon, Note, Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors: A Question of
Life or Death, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 781, 814 (1990). The Declaration allows con-
sent by a legal guardian when the subject is legally incompetent. Id. (citations omit-
ted). See also 21 C.F.R. § 312.120 (requiring that foreign clinical studies accepted by
FDA be conducted under minimum standards of Helsinki Declaration); Hon. Sir
Gerard Brennan, A.C., C.M.G., Law in Search of a Principle, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 259, 261 (1993) (stating that Helsinki Declaration expanded Code); Katz,
supra note 63, at 227-28 (suggesting Nuremberg Code was "dethroned" by Helsinki
Declaration); Perley et al., supra note 73, at 157-60 (providing in-depth comparison
of Helsinki Declaration and Nuremberg Code principles); Sharon Perley, Note, From
Control Over One's Body to Control over One's Body Parts: Extending the Doctrine of
Informed Consent, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 335, 342 n.43 (1992) (indicating differences be-
tween Nuremberg Code and Helsinki Declaration).
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a benign, rather than wary, view toward science and research.'
Written by and for physicians, the Declaration exudes faith in
the methods and goals of medical science and accepts the prem-
ise that progress requires human subjects.8'
Today, human experimentation is regulated by a crazy-quilt
of hortatory codes and maxims, scattered federal laws and regu-
lations, and most importantly, by Institutional Review Boards,85
which provide peer review of proposed experiments.86 "Informed
'3 For example, the Helsinki Declaration provides for cases where the research
subject is legally incompetent to provide consent by allowing a guardian to consent.
Perley et al., supra note 73, at 158. The greatest difference between the two codes is
the Declaration's recognition and regulation of therapeutic research. Id. The Decla-
ration recognized that the same ethical principles should govern when experi-
menting on healthy volunteers as when experimenting on those in need of care. Id.
The Code only addressed nontherapeutic experimentation. Id.
In 1964, at the 18th World Medical Assembly, the World Medical Association
promulgated the Declaration of Helsinki. See Declaration of Helsinki: Recommenda-
tions Guiding Doctors in Clinical Research, reprinted in THE NAZI DOCTORS, supra
note 44, at 331-39. The Declaration professes that "[ilt is the mission of the doctor to
safeguard the health of the people. His knowledge and conscience are dedicated to
the fulfillment of this mission." Id. at 331. The World Medical Association saw it as
"essential that the results of laboratory experiments be applied to human beings to
further scientific knowledge and to help suffering humanity." Id. at 331; Perley et
al., supra note 73, at 158; Perley, supra note 82, at 344.
85 For a complete review of the structure and function of Institutional Review
Boards, see, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.107-111 (1994); 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.101-114 (1994).
"IRB approval means the determination of the IRB that the research has been re-
viewed and may be conducted at an institution within the constraints set forth by
the IRB and by other institutional and federal requirements." 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(h).
88 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a).
Each IRB shall have at least five members, with varying backgrounds to
promote complete and adequate review of research activities .... The IRB
shall be sufficiently qualified through the experience and expertise of its
members, and the diversity of the members ... to promote respect for its
advice and counsel in safeguarding the rights and welfare of human sub-jects .... The IRB shall therefore include persons knowledgeable in these
areas ....
Id. The regulatory structure controlling human experimentation and research is a
vast topic, beyond the scope of this Essay. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.409
(regulating research involving human subjects through use of IRB's); 21 C.F.R.
§§ 50.1-.48 (regulating clinical investigations regulated by F.D.A.); 21 C.F.R.
§§ 312.1-.120 (promulgating procedures and regulations for use of investigational
new drugs). See generally DENNIS M. MALONEY, PROTECTION OF HUMAN RESEARCH
SUBJECTS (1984) (providing comprehensive presentation of regulations governing
human experimentation, designed to help researchers); William J. Curran, Govern-
mental Regulation of the Use of Human Subjects in Medical Research: The Approach
of Two Federal Agencies, 98 DAEDALUS 542 (1969) (overviewing both Food and Drug
Administration and National Institutes of Health regulations pertaining to medical
research); Glantz, supra note 70, at 183-200 (noting that Code is not law, and has
had little influence on law in United States); LEVINE, supra note 49, at 69-115, 207-
WHY INFORMED CONSENT?
consent" is still the touchstone, but modern regulations and pro-
cedures tolerate and expect deviations from this ideal.87 Thus,
when addressing human experimentation-and they rarely
do-courts occasionally mention the Code, but generally apply
and enforce the more flexible informed consent requirements of
later regulations.8
The legal doctrine of informed consent as it has developed is
quite different from the dignity-based commitment to self-
determination animating the Nuremberg Code.89 The most im-
portant feature of today's regulatory regime is that it focuses on
43 (discussing informed consent in general and discussing function and role of IRB).
87 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 50.23 (listing "exceptions from general requirements" of
informed consent); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116(c), (d) (describing situations where informed
consent is not required).
" See generally Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96 (3d. Cir. 1983) (barring claim
that soldier's widow's miscarriages and son's birth defects were caused by soldier's
radiation exposure; Feres doctrine bars claims incident to active duty), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1023 (1984); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981)
(dissenting judge cited Nuremberg Code as justification for soldier's claim, although
court held that United States was immune from claim that Government's nuclear
explosion experiment caused soldier's death), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982); Karp
v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 423-24 (5th Cir.) (denying wrongful death claim brought by
widow of recipient of first mechanical heart, finding "human experimentation" evi-
dence irrelevant because heart had therapeutic value), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845
(1974); Begay v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 991, 998 (D. Ariz. 1984) (distinguishing
data gathering from experimentation in denying Native American's tort claim for
injuries allegedly caused by exposure to uranium radiation), affd, 768 F.2d 1059
(9th Cir. 1985); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (authorizing
removal of kidney from mentally retarded adult for transplant to brother after re-
ceiving consent from guardian). "Apparently because of my indelible recollection of a
government which, to the everlasting shame of its citizens, embarked on a program
of genocide and experimentation with human bodies I have been more troubled in
reaching a decision in this case than in any other." Id. at 149 (Steinfeld, J., dissent-
ing); Annas, Mengele's Birthmark, supra note 45 (providing review of United States
court decisions citing Nuremberg Code).
But see Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237 n.2 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (noting Justice O'Connor's opinion in United States v. Stanley, infra, which
stated that Due Process guarantees at least compensation for violations of consent
principle of Nuremberg Code); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686-90 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Nuremberg Code and decrying Army secret LSD
experiments); Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (declining
relief sought by subject suffering organic brain damage after applying Nuremberg
standard for consent), affd, 829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987); Jaffee, 663 F.2d at 1249
(Gibbons, J., dissenting) (noting that radiation experiments violated Nuremberg
Code and other principles of international law).
89 See Glantz, supra note 70, at 189-91 (criticizing version of informed consent in
federal regulations for departing from Code's strict requirements); Jay Katz, In-
formed Consent: A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 143-64 (1977)
[hereinafter Katz, Informed Consent] (tracing development of informed consent doc-
trine since Nuremberg).
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the subject's state of mind more than on the experiment itself.9"
What is referred to here as the "Standard Model" of informed
consent is this subjectively oriented informed consent in the con-
text of peer review. In practice, research peers have proven in-
sufficiently critical when evaluating proposed experiments.9 In
addition, the informed consent "requirement" is viewed as a
chore and a ritual, an impersonal incantation, a hurried signing
of papers.92 We know this is true, yet we cherish the myth of in-
formed consent, skating over its lack of real content or impact. 3
But because the Standard Model is a subterfuge aimed more at
easing our consciences than at protecting research subjects, 4 it
fails both as a necessary condition for proposed experiments95
and as a justification for them.
IV. THE STANDARD MODEL IN ACTION: INFORMED CONSENT IN
HARD CASES
So far, this discussion has had two points. First, trouble-
some and abusive experiments on human subjects occur more of-
ten than we realize or admit.99 Second, these unsettling cases
arise despite, or because of, a loose regulatory regime that dele-
gates the duty of reviewing experiments to a peer-review board
'0 See Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dig-
nity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L. J. 683, 690-
91 (1975) (stating that informed consent is used to "emphasize a patient's or sub-
ject's actual state of mind, knowledge or understanding ... rather than to emphasize
... the conduct required of the therapist or experimenter.").
9' "IRB's as currently constituted do not protect research subjects but rather pro-
tect the institution and the institution's investigator." Jay Katz, Human Experimen-
tation and Human Rights, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 7, 40 (1993) [hereinafter Katz,
Human Experimentation] (citations omitted). The objectivity of IRB members may
be suspect because of built-in conflicts of interest. Id. at 17, 32-33.
92 See generally Katz, Informed Consent, supra note 89 (calling law of informed
consent a fairy tale myth).
9' Id. at 137-38 (noting our "childlike conviction" that implied consent has mean-
ing and that we "go to great lengths in denying that the emperor has no clothes").
' See Calabresi, supra note 27, at 389-90 (noting "beauty" of decision-making de-
vices which hide and depersonalize our decisions to exploit others, and which allow
us to continue to profess commitments to life as sacred).
9' See O'Connor, supra note 68, at 178 (indicating that situations arise which cre-
ate pressure, resulting in activities without compliance with informed consent); see
also supra note 87 (citing regulations which provide exceptions to informed consent
reauirement).
"[Tihe actions of the Nazi physicians were not isolated instances of 'crimes
against humanity' .... Similar transgressions occurred prior to the Nuremberg trials
and continue to occur, though because they are less dramatic their existence is more
likely to be denied." JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HuMAN BEINGS 283 (1972).
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and unenthusiastically requires research subjects' informed con-
sent.97
Admittedly, in most cases, research experiments using hu-
man subjects are relatively innocuous. Consent is easily ob-
tained and its validity unquestioned. The risks are low, the
goals are clear, and the subjects are everyday people in
nonthreatening situations. At the other end of the spectrum are
the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital experiments," the Tus-
kegee Syphilis Study,99 and the Nazi doctors' case."° These Doc-
tors' cases are easy to analyze and condemn, even for the most
ardent research supporters, because subjects were deceived and
coerced. In more difficult cases, however, even when it appears
that the subject consented freely, an uneasy sense remains.'0 '
Sometimes the subject does not, or cannot, consent, but it is im-
perative that the experiment nonetheless go forward."°2 How
does the Standard Model of informed consent handle such cases?
The Standard Model regulates experiments by requiring the
subjects' informed consent. Comparatively little attention is
given to the nature of the experiment itself-apart from its
riskiness-or to the researcher's goals and intentions. 3  Under
9' See supra note 88 (citing case law addressing claimed unethical experimenta-
tion on human subjects); see also Barrett v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 1291
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that United States negligently caused death by using in-
adequately tested drug in human experimentation); Molsbergen v. United States,
757 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir.) (holding widow's claim for wrongful death of husband due to
exposure to radiation from Government experimentation was not barred), cert. dis-
missed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985); Clay v. Martin, 509 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1975) (allowing
prisoner's claim for alleged inhumane treatment under medical experimentation).
'6See supra note 50.
9See supra note 49.
'0o See supra note 51.
'0' See Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 829 F.2d 1340, 1343 (1987) (labeling risk of ex-
periment which increased permanent brain damage as unforeseeable, therefore jus-
tifying university's failure to refer to it on consent form).
2 This may occur with mental patients, the developmentally disabled, Alz-
heimer's patients, and in extreme medical emergencies. See Philip M. Bein, Surro-
gate Consent & the Incompetent Experimental Subject, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM L.J.
739, 739 (1991); see supra, note 87, for regulatory exceptions to informed consent.
103 Federal regulations define research as "a systematic investigation ... designed
to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge. Activities which meet this
definition constitute research for purposes of this policy." 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) It
appears that if research doesn't satisfy this definition, the researcher can avoid
these regulations. Additionally, the IRB is directed to review only the informed con-
sent form, the risk involved, and general research activities before approving or dis-
approving the research program. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.109. The regulation makes no
mention of requiring IRB investigation of the goals and intentions of the researcher.
477
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the Standard Model, concern may be triggered by some charac-
teristic of the subject (age, health, mental capabilities) or by the
experiment's location (prison, hospital, university). These char-
acteristics and locations, however, relate less to whether the re-
searcher's plan is itself ethical, than whether the subject's
consent was really given, or was truly informed."' When ex-
periments are prohibited, it is due to the quality, or lack thereof,
of the consent given, not the propriety of the experiment itself."'
In these situations, whatever it is that gives the subject's consent
its justificatory power-the mysterious indicia of autonomy
worth respecting-is deemed lacking. To illustrate this dynamic
at work, I review below the operation of the Standard Model in
three paradigmatically hard cases."°
A. Prisoners
Prisoners have long been conveniently immobile, docile, and
hence ideal subjects for research and experimentation: "[P]risons
are almost ideal places to conduct research. Life is routine and
subject to few variations. The population is relatively stable ....
The imposition of experimental procedures that might inconven-
ience free-living subjects is not a burden on prisoners. It is also
less expensive .... "10o Accordingly, experimentation on prisoners
is carefully scrutinized under the Standard Model. °8 The De-
partment of Health and Human Services warns that "prisoners
may be under constraints because of their incarceration which
could affect their ability to make a truly voluntary and uncoerced
Id.
104 Age, health, and mental capabilities address a human subject's ability to give
legally competent consent. See Perley et al., supra note 73, at 155 (indicating some
classes of human subjects lack legal capacity to give consent). The location of the
research project presents issues of "captive exploitation" of the subjects involved.
See Glantz, supra note 70, at 191-92 (discussing problems with research conducted
at prisons on prisoners). Captivity undercuts the voluntariness of the consent given.
Id.
105 See supra note 104.
"' See generally Glantz, supra note 70, at 191-94 (discussing problems with re-
search on prisoners and children); Lasagna, supra note 56 (reviewing problems as-
sociated with use of prisoners, children, and mentally ill in human experimenta-
tion).
107 ANNAS ET AL., supra note 69, at 103.
'08 See generally id. at 103-38 (discussing problem of voluntariness with prison-
ers); Lasagna, supra note 56, at 449-55 (discussing issues surrounding prisoners as
research subjects); LEVINE, supra note 49, at 181-96 (highlighting informed consent
concerns when prisoners are used in experimentation); MALONEY, supra note 86, at
343-60.
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decision whether or not to participate as subjects in research.""9
This concern about prisoners' capacity to choose goes to the
heart of the Nuremberg Code, which took its shape precisely be-
cause the Code's drafters were so appalled at experiments con-
ducted under duress." ° Therefore, the scope of prisoner research
eligible for federal funding is limited to, among other things, the
study of possible causes of incarceration and criminal behavior,
of prisons as institutions, and of conditions affecting prisoners as
a class."' It is important to note the underlying motivation for
these regulations. Prisoners are presumed less able to choose
freely because they supposedly suffer from false consciousness
about their own best interests, not because researchers simply
should not be experimenting on the most vulnerable among us."
The best known prison research case is Kaimowitz v. Michi-
gan Department of Mental Health."' John Doe had been commit-
ted to a state hospital as a criminal sexual psychopath."4 After
17 years of hospitalization, he was designated a suitable re-
search subject for a study of "uncontrollable aggression.""' The
research was designed to compare the effects on male hormone
flow of a psychosurgical procedure with those of a particular
1o9 45 C.F.R. § 46.302.
110 As General Taylor said, "[i]n the tyranny that was Nazi Germany, no one could
give such a consent to the medical agents of the state; everyone lived in fear and
acted under duress." Telford Taylor, Opening Statement of the Prosecution, Decem-
ber 9, 1946, in THE NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 44, at 89. Principle 1 of the Nurem-
berg Code stated, "the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent;
[they] should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice without ...
duress." Supra note 68 (principle 1 of Code).i 45 C.F.R. § 46.306(a)(2)(i-iii) (1994). The Department of Health and Human
Services' regulations also call for special Institutional Review Boards with addi-
tional duties, including ensuring that the risks of the experiment are commensurate
with risks which would be accepted by nonprisoners, and that the possible advan-
tages of participating in the experiment are not so great as to impair the prisoners
ability to decide in the "limited choice environment of the prison ...." 45 C.F.R. § 46.-
304-305 (1994).
112 See ANNAS ET AL., supra note 69, at 103-38 (discussing how research with pris-
oners presents "problem of voluntariness"); Grodin, supra note 69, at 138
(discussing federal regulations addressing research using prisoners).
1' Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973), summa-
rized in 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (July 31, 1973), reported in 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.
147 (1976). See generally John R. Mason, Note, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental
Health. A Right to Be Free From Experimental Psychosurgery?, 54 B.U. L. REV. 301
(1974) (discussing moral and legal dilemmas involved with psychosurgery when
subject is mental patient).
14 Kaimowitz, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 147.
115 Id.
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drug."' Doe was the only known appropriate candidate for the
surgery.117  He signed an informed consent form; his parents'
consent was also obtained."' A "Scientific Review Committee"
and a "Human Rights Review Committee" reviewed and ap-
proved the proposed experiment."9
The Michigan court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus,
decided the case despite a burst of publicity which stymied the
experiment.2 ° The court noted the uncertainty and risk sur-
rounding psychosurgery, and insisted that "[p]sychosurgery
should never be undertaken upon involuntarily committed
populations, when there is a high-risk low-benefits ratio as dem-
onstrated in this case. This is because of the impossibility of ob-
taining truly informed consent from such populations . The
court added that "there must be close scrutiny of the adequacy of
the consent when an experiment ... is dangerous, intrusive, irre-
versible, and of uncertain benefit to the patient and society."'
2 2
The court also discussed the Nuremberg Code's informed consent
requirement, the effects of institutionalization on prisoners' de-
cision-making capabilities,2 ' and its concerns about inequalities
6 Id. On the ethical issues posed by psychosurgery, see ANNAS ET AL., supra note
109, at 215-55 (defining psychosurgery as "any procedure that destroys brain tissue
for the primary purpose of modifying behavior."). Psychosurgery may be enjoying a
renaissance of sorts. See, e.g., Michael W. Miller, Brain Surgery is Back in a Limited
Way to Treat Mental Ills, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1994, at Al.
.. Kaimowitz, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 147.
118 Id.
119 Id. See Burt, supra note 47, at 26-27 (describing committees involved in Kai-
mowitz Experiment).
120 Kaimowitz became aware of the experimental work about to be performed on
John Doe and made his concern known to the Detroit Free Press. Kaimowitz, 1
MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 147. A substantial amount of media coverage ensued
and the case was filed shortly thereafter. Id. As a result of the coverage and the
pending legal action, funding for the experiment was stopped. Id. Shortly thereafter,
the research doctors dropped the planned experiment. Id. The lawsuit continued af-
ter the court determined that the case was not moot. Id.
121 Kaimowitz, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 148 (emphasis added).
122 Id. at 149 (citations omitted). It is ironic that the court found that the novelty
of psychosurgery weighed against its permissibility. As Robert Burt has commented,
prison is itself "experimental" in that its deleterious effects have not been ade-
quately researched, nor its benefits established. Burt, supra note 47, at 31. See gen-
erally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977) (discussing prisons and symbolic power of punishment).
122 Kaimowitz, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 150-51; see also ANNAS ET AL., su-
pra note 69, at 240-41 (discussing recommendation for insuring informed consent in
psychosurgery cases via IRB hearings on subject's ability to consent to procedure).
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in bargaining power.124
Kaimowitz is dramatic, but not unique. 125  The case illus-
trates a difficulty with using informed consent as the moral
touchstone for research on prisoners.'26 The insidiously perva-
sive message of modem penology, which may unfortunately jus-
tify experimentation, is that prisoners need reform, reshaping
and alteration.'" Prisoners may be conditioned by prison to see
themselves as "in need of repair." 8 Consequently, prisoners
might well decide that a dangerous "reformatory" experimental
treatment is in their best interests and then decide, quite ra-
tionally, to take a high-risk gamble on freedom. A prisoner like
Doe who consents to psychosurgery may have fallen into false
consciousness or he may shrewdly have decided that a chance at
freedom is worth a scalpel to the head. The Kaimowitz court
claimed to protect Doe's best interests 9 by forbidding experi-
ments in prison, but Doe might well have answered, "easy for
you to say! It's my funeral, and I want out!" Who are we to say
no? Alternatively, a prisoner might simply want to give some-
thing back to society, to redeem, atone, and reconcile. Why
should he be stopped?' The Standard Model provides no an-
-4 Kaimowitz, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 149-50.
125 See, e.g., Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1979) (holding that prison
conditions did not render prisoners' participation involuntary); Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-23 (1990) (defining right of prisoner to avoid unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drug).
126 The Kaimowitz decision held that adequate informed consent can be obtained
from a mental patient if the procedure was an accepted medical procedure. Kaimow-
itz, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 153. However, in Kaimowitz, the psychosurgical
procedure was determined to be experimental, thereby invalidating the informed
consent given. Id. The Kaimowitz court does not give adequate consideration to
other issues surrounding informed consent from the institutionalized. See generally
ANNAS ET AL., supra note 69 at 103-193 (discussing issues surrounding experimen-
tation on institutionalized persons).
127 See generally NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND
COMMUNITY VALUES (1994) (providing overview of goals of criminal punishment).
128 Burt, supra note 47, at 30 (citing Doe's situation in Kaimowitz as illustrative of
how institutionalized persons come to view themselves as desperately needing help
at any cost).
'2 Guido Calabresi once remarked to the author that the real issue in Kaimowitz
was the court's-and our-unwillingness to face the fact that prison life was so bad
that persons would risk even psychosurgery to get out. As Robert Burt noted,"[b]y
withholding the possibility of legally consented psychosurgery from John Doe, we
are thus protecting ourselves more than him." Id. at 34.
0 One critic of excessive "protection" for prisoners notes that "opponents of pris-
oner research seem supremely indifferent to readily available opinions of many
prisoner subjects that 'protection' from the chance to be a subject is not a boon, but a
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B. The Terminally Ill
"[Tihe most used and useful of all experimental subjects is
the patient with disease.""' For example, John Russell, suffering
from lung problems, was the recipient of the first lung trans-
plant."' In addition to enduring his life threatening illness, Rus-
sell was serving a life sentence for murder, making him doubly
vulnerable. 3' Russell succumbed to his illness despite the lung
transplant. 1 4 Boyd Rush, the first chimpanzee heart recipient,
was a poor deaf-mute, and did not consent to the transplant
when he arrived at the hospital unconscious and dying.'35 Jeffer-
son Davis, a poor black man dying of glomerulonephritis, agreed
to a chimpanzee kidney transplant after doctors told him he
would otherwise die.' He died anyway, two months later.'37 In
further limiting of the convict's options." HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 64,
at 21; see also Lasagna, supra note 56, at 454-55 (questioning whether prisoners'
rights are protected by preventing them from volunteering for experiments). In a
more provocative vein, Robert Burt asks why, if we are willing to incarcerate some,
and to experiment on some, we do not let prisoners chose between the two socially
sanctioned options? Burt, supra note 47, at 27; Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203, 220
(D. Maryland 1979) ("[Plaintiffs cases] do not address the question of the constitu-
tionality of offering a choice to an inmate to participate in a worthwhile but un-
pleasant activity which may be more attractive to him because of his
environment."); Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA Treatment of the
Sexual Offender, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 21 (1990) (arguing that prisoner participation
in castration experiments should be valid despite their personal interests in reliev-
ing boredom, earning money, improving living conditions, and getting released).
131 George J. Annas, The Hospital: A Human Rights Wasteland, 1 CIV. LIB. REV. 9,
15 (1974) [hereinafter Annas, The Hospital] (quoting leading medical commentator
Franz Ingelfinger). See generally Henry K Beecher, M.D., Ethical Problems Created
by the Hopelessly Unconscious Patient, 278 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1425, 1430 (1968)
(noting importance of tissues and organs of terminally ill for research and experi-
mentation purposes); EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 50, at 1053-108 (reporting case
studies of dying patients as research subjects and organ donors); Lasagna, supra
note 56, at 455-57 (noting scientific problems associated with use of dying research
subjects).
13 Dr. James D. Hardy performed the world's first lung transplant on John Rich-
ard Russell in 1963. Lung Recipient Leaves Hospital, UPI, Mar. 12, 1987 available
in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, UPI File.
133 Id.
13 Id.
'35 Dr. James D. Hardy performed the surgery after Rush's sister signed the con-
sent form indicating a "suitable heart" (emphasis supplied) would be found. Appar-
ently Dr. Hardy interpreted "suitable heart" broadly enough to justify the use of a
chimpanzee heart. See ANNAS ET AL., supra note 69, at 15-16.
... Id. at 15.
'37 EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 50.
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all these cases, the person's "dying status was used against [him]
as the primary justification for the experiment."3 ' Additionally,
in all of these cases, the ritual of obtaining consent was imple-
mented more as a formality than an opportunity for choice or a
vehicle for empowerment.' 39
As with prisoners, experimentation with terminally or griev-
ously ill patients distorts the Standard Model.4 ° Like children or
the mentally handicapped, dying persons are often thought of as
incapable of making informed decisions;' and like prisoners,
they are viewed as not "really" free, but instead, captive to the
course of their disease and therefore under duress.4 Even when
these patients are lucid, we fear their assessment of an experi-
ment's benefits and risks may be skewed; we worry they might
submit to quackery in a hopeless and desperate attempt to beat
the inevitable.4 We also worry that the dying may, having
abandoned all hope, submit to immoral experiments out of mis-
placed or entirely genuine altruism.'" Finally, we fear that we
George J. Annas, Baby Fae: The Anything Goes' School of Human Experimen-
tation, in JUDGING MEDICINE, supra note 56, at 384-85 [hereinafter Annas, Baby
Fae].
'39 See supra notes 107-38 and infra notes 140-74 (discussing consent issues when
research subjects are prisoners, terminally ill, or children).
'40 On a related issue, see Robert L. Schwartz, Informed Consent to Participation
in Medical Research Employing Elderly Human Subjects, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POLY 115 (1985).
The attributes found more frequently among elderly research subjects than
among younger subjects-cognitive and emotional impairment, impaired
vision and hearing, difficulty in resisting coercion, dependence on family
and health care providers, acceptance of non-mainstream values, institu-
tionalization in nursing homes--require that the doctrine of competent,
voluntary, informed consent be especially carefully applied in research
employing elderly subjects.
Id. at 130.
141 See Jacquelyn A. Beatty, Comment, Artificial Nutrition and the Terminally Ill:
How Should Washington Decide?, 61 WASH. L. REv. 419, 423 (1986) (noting that le-
gal and medical authorities advocate greater emotional comfort and dignity and less
aggressive medical intervention for dying patients).
1 See EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 50, at 1053; Compassion in Dying v. State of
Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 592 (9th Cir. 1996) (declaring state has interest in "not
subjecting the elderly and even the not-elderly but infirm to psychological pressure
to consent to their own deaths."), reversed, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
'43 But see Delaney, supra note 44, at 418-19 (advocating access to experimental
therapies for AIDS patients).
1 One commentator, writing about the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital Case,
suggested that dying patients might volunteer for experiments, thinking, "I know it
is too late for me. Maybe this will help somebody else." Earl Ubell, Injecting Cancer
Cells - The Case for the Defense, N.Y. HERALD TRIB. 29, col. 5 (Jan. 26, 1964), re-
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may be tempted to exploit these subjects' despair, incapacity, or
altruism, and to railroad through experiments which might not
otherwise pass ethical muster.
Given these concerns, how does the Standard Model treat
terminally ill research subjects? As with Doe in Kaimowitz,145 we
often use the patient's desperation to disempower his consent.
His terror of death is a surrogate for duress, and so his consent
is not voluntary. On the other hand, if we feel that the experi-
ment is useful or necessary, and not that demeaning or danger-
ous, we might choose not to look behind the act of consent. After
all, if we are too critical of consent once given, we lose valuable
research resources. We cannot afford to be too scrupulous.
Consider here the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital case,4"
in which three doctors injected dying and uninformed patients
with live cancer cells.'47 The experiment was completely unre-
lated to the patients' normal medical programs, violating what
one writer has called the "fundamental privilege of the sick."48
During the resulting controversy, the plaintiffs objected that ac-
tual consent should have been, but was not, given by the pa-
tients.'49 They did not claim that the experiment itself was
unethical. 5 ° But what if the patients had consented? Should
they have been treated like lucid altruists, eager to do their
share in the fight against cancer, or like the desperate and
grasping patients whose volition we question? Or, should we
place all such patients outside the realm of available subjects
and refuse to use their misfortune for our own and others' bene-
printed in EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 50, at 39-40.
"' See generally Mason, supra note 113, at 319 (explaining that institutionalized
individuals are particularly vulnerable to pressures that may impair judgment and
cannot freely choose experimental psychosurgery).
'1 Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 251 N.Y.S.2d 818 (2d Dep't 1964),
rev'd 15 N.Y.2d 317 (N.Y. 1965); see also EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 50, at 9-65
(analyzing research policies, administration, and consequences of Jewish Chronic
Disease Hospital case).
141 Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d at 318-19.
1'4 Jonas, supra note 22, at 238. "The expiring moments should be watched over
with piety and be safe from exploitation." Id. at 245.
149 See Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d at 319-20.
"5 See EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 50, at 60-3 (reprinting Hospital Board of
Regents' Discipline Committee Recommendations indicating that nature of particu-
lar experiment was unethical separate and apart from issue of whether consent was
properly given). There was medical consensus that the experiments were not in fact
harmful to the patients. Id. See also Ubell, supra note 144, at 39 (noting small like-
lihood of successfully transplanting cancer from one human being to another and
trumpeting benefits of such experiments in developing cancer vaccine).
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C. Children
The use of children poses even thornier problems for re-
search."2 We need to experiment on children; their problems and
illnesses are often sui generis and can only be solved through ex-
periments on them. However, the Standard Model assumes
children cannot give adequate consent, and so it gives in to ne-
cessity, 53 though the Nuremberg Code insisted that the subject's
consent was essential.'54 Because children cannot, by definition,
give consent, we settle for less.' In addition, because children
are a necessary and unique research class, we are forced to face
the steely utilitarian calculus that hides beneath the Standard
Model's veneer of respect for persons.""
The Standard Model requires someone's consent, and par-
ents are the most obvious candidates."7 However, even parents
'5' See Jonas, supra note 22, at 238-39 (insisting that sick subjects never be used
except for own benefit).
112 See generally AN-NAS, ET AL., supra note 69, at 63-101 (addressing whether
children are capable of giving and understanding consent and parent's legal capacity
to consent for their children); CHILDREN AS RESEARCH SUBJECTS: SCIENCE, ETHICS,
AND THE LAW (Michael A. Grodin & Leonard H. Glantz, eds. 1994) (collection of es-
says on difficult questions posed by experimentation and research on children); La-
sagna, supra note 56, at 457-58 (discussing controversial issues surrounding use of
children in experiments); See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401-409 (1994) ("Additional Pro-
tection for Children Involved as Research Subjects"). A recent news item noted that
the Food and Drug Administration does not require drug makers to test over-the-
counter drugs for children "before putting them on the market, in part because of
ethical questions." Elyse Tanouye, Toddlers Taking Many Drugs, Mostly Untested,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1994, at B1.
"" "So spake the Fiend, and with necessity, The tyrant's plea, excused his devilish
deeds." Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B. 273, 288 (1884) (quoting J. MILTON,
PARADISE LOST, BIV, lines 393-94).
' See Barry Kellman, Judicial Abdication of Military Tort Accountability: But
Who is to Guard the Guards Themselves?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1597, 1621 (1989)
(interpreting Nuremburg Code as mandating voluntary consent prior to experimen-
tation).
"' Some do argue, however, that because children cannot give rational consent,
they might be excluded from research altogether. See Frederick S. Carney, A Moral
Analysis of Human Experimentation, in HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 64,
at 132, 145.
156 See ANNAS ET AL., supra note 69, at 63-64 (indicating that beneficial nature of
research on children does not establish its legality).
"' In some circumstances, federal regulations waive the parental consent re-
quirement. But see 45 C.F.R. § 46.408(c) (1994) (waiving consent requirements
where parental permission is "not a reasonable requirement to protect the subjects,"
as in abuse and neglect circumstances).
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might not be able to isolate and protect an individual child's
safety and dignity, especially when another child is thrown into
the equation.'58 The same considerations that call into question
whether a prisoner's consent was voluntary or informed might
undermine a desperate parent's consent as well.
In the famous "Baby Fae" case, a poor and dying child was
given an experimental baboon heart transplant.'59 Although a
committee, appointed by the National Institutes of Health, re-
viewed the experiment and the child's mother consented, 16 the
transplant remains a distressing example of conceit and exploi-
tation.' The mother was most certainly influenced by her
child's desperate situation. Even if her consent was freely and
knowingly given, the question perhaps should never have been
asked.
In Hart v. Brown,62 doctors preparing to transplant a kidney
from one identical twin to another sought declaratory judgment
that the twins' parents had the right to consent to the proce-
dure.6 3 The court observed, following the Standard Model, that
children, of course, do "not have the legal capacity to consent.""
The court then described the urgent need for the procedure, the
relative lack of risk to the donor, and the prospects for success."'
Importantly, the court insisted that such a transplant was not
experimental, but rather "medically accepted therapy.",16 Given
the circumstances, the court held that the parents could consent
... For example, in Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972), the state
reviewed the decision of parents to consent to elective kidney surgery on one child in
order to prevent the death of another child. See Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for
the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645,
668-70 (1977). See also ANNAS ET AL., supra note 69, at 86 (discussing transplant
cases where parents might view healthy child as means to end of curing sick child
and distorted rate of parent as protector of donor child).
159 See Lawrence K Altman, Survival Record is Set by Heart Implant Baby, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1984, at 18.
... See Harry Nelson, Baby Fae's Kin Knew of Risks, U.S. Study Says, L.A. TIMES,
March 15, 1985, at 3.
16' See generally Annas, Baby Fae, supra note 140, at 384-90.
162 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
113 Id. at 387.
164 Id.
115 Id. at 388-90.
6 Id. at 390. The court also noted, however, that there was authority that par-
ents can consent to nontherapeutic operations on their children as well, citing Bon-
ner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (validating parental consent to
transfer of skin from a 15-year old son to his burned cousin).
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to the transplant. 167  Although the court emphasized that the
parents had given long and careful thought to the matter, 168 the
focus of the decision was on the procedure itself, its relative
safety, and the need for the kidney. 9 Since the kidney was
needed, the parents' consent would suffice. 70
With children, therefore, the Standard Model of informed
consent is stymied. Faced with a subject who presumably cannot
consent, the Standard Model looks for someone else's consent.
This is a big jump. After all, informed consent supposedly le-
gitimates and justifies experimentation because that consent
protects autonomy; but how can it when someone else is provid-
ing the consent? "Proxy consent" is an oxymoron if consent truly
aims at protecting self-autonomy and self-determination. 7'
Through proxy consent, the subject is labelled a morally impo-
tent agent-less than autonomous. This is because the unspo-
ken, but persistent, utilitarianism which underlies so much of
our thinking about experimentation requires us to find some way
to permit needed experiments while still giving lip-service to our
values. It is not that we are lying in these cases; we are genu-
inely torn.'72 We are utilitarian and we are committed to human
dignity; when we are forced to compromise, we need to hide the
tradeoff and to profess continued respect for the value that lost
out.'73 The Standard Model reflects the tension inevitably pro-
duced by this tragic compromise. 4
Hart, 289 A.2d at 391.
' Id. at 389-90.
"69 Id. at 388-90. In fact, after consideration of the medical evidence offered at the
hearing, the court concluded "that scientifically this type of procedure is a 'perfect'
transplant." Id. at 389.
170 Id. at 391.
' ANNAS ET AL., supra note 69, at 87-89 (discussing proxy consent as contradic-
tion in terms).
'7' See Goldstein, supra note 90, at 702 (noting that we are not "unambiguously
committed to human dignity").
173 See CALABRESI & BOBBIT, supra note 26, at 195-99; see also Calabresi, supra
note 27, at 393 (advocating experimental control system that balances present
against future lives and preserves choice).
174 Katz, Informed Consent, supra note 89, at 174.
The resulting tensions have had a significant impact on the law of in-
formed consent which only has made a bow toward a commitment to pa-
tients' self-determination, perhaps in an attempt to resolve these tensions
by a belief that it is "less important that this commitment be total that we
believe it to be there."
Id. (citations omitted).
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D. How the Standard Model Undermines Human Dignity
Although informed consent works for noncontroversial, rou-
tine experiments that are easily justified and for which consent
serves only as a trivial, albeit necessary, condition, it fails us in
the hard cases. If we need to perform the experiment in a diffi-
cult case, we will. If necessary, we proceed without consent or
with only a perfunctory acquiescence, which may reflect des-
peration, resignation, or simply confusion, but certainly not a ro-
bust commitment to human dignity and autonomy. We, in fact,
insult human dignity but cloak our affront beneath a fiction or
formality which creates the illusion that we really do value con-
sent, dignity, and autonomy. 175 In addition, when we suspect
that an experiment is unethical, or simply too dangerous, we
ground our objections in either "shaggy dog stories"176 about how
consent was not given-assuming that if it had been given, our
objections would be deflected-or on an argument that the con-
sent given was inadequate.
By focusing on the subject's state of mind instead of the con-
duct of the scientist, the Standard Model constrains the subject's
autonomy, the very autonomy it purports to protect.177  The
Standard Model asks others to judge the quality of a person's
subjective processes, 8 to decide whether they measure up to
those of the mythical rational actor who, coincidentally, probably
thinks and acts much like the observer. But by deconstructing
and disempowering the consent, we subjugate the subject.79 Af-
ter all, "[i]ndividual freedom ... is guaranteed only if people are
"' Id. at 172-74 (insisting that informed consent doctrine does not really reflect
commitment to self-determination).
171 See Burt, supra note 47, at 27 (discussing "shaggy dog stories" implemented as
means of obscuring "judicial whimsy" in informed consent cases).
... See Goldstein, supra note 90, at 686 ("Law should establish standards of con-
duct for the authorities, not the citizens."). This objection is distinct from the other
obvious problem with the Standard Model, that even when given, informed consent
is often a mere ritual and its pretensions of serving human dignity often a fairy tale.
... See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J.
763, 786 (1983) (paternalistic "cooling-off" restrictions on contractual freedom aim to
cure supposed defects in agents' reasoning processes).
"9 See Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 U. VA. L. REV. 1363,
1375 n.31 (1988) ("The view that the decisions of death penalty defendants or death-
row inmates are never competent or voluntary undermines respect for the prisoner's
autonomy while pretending to honor it."); Kronman, supra note 178, at 795
(asserting that paternalistic mandatory "cooling off" period "implies a moral defi-
ciency in those to whom it applies"); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1170 (warning of
danger to autonomy by viewing desires and preferences as mere social constructs).
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given the right to make choices which would generally be re-
garded as foolish."'
Now, a true ethics of autonomy would require experimenters
to "inform for decision," or to refrain from informing if the sub-
ject so requests. Whether the subject actually consented-in
some metaphysically pure sense-would be as irrelevant as it is
inscrutable.' With this view, respect for human dignity does
not require that we insure "informed"-read, "correct in the eyes
of outsiders"-consent, but rather that self-determination be
given free rein. Rules that focus on the subject's reasoning proc-
ess rather than on the conduct of experimenters disserve their
supposed purpose. On the other hand, informing for the deci-
sion, rather than judging the informedness of that decision, does
respect human autonomy. The Standard Model of informed con-
sent claims, but fails, to do the same. It professes "fairy tale-like
optimism about human capacities for 'intelligent' choice," but
demonstrates a "mythic pessimism of human capacities to be
choice-makers." 12
But are we content with the ethics of autonomy? Our dig-
nity may be analytically and morally prior to our autonomy.
Dignity may require respecting autonomy-as-free-choice in some
circumstances, but at the same time it may also require objective
limits on practices, behaviors, procedures, and institutions which
are in themselves inconsistent with the dignity of persons. We
have designated respect for consent as a marker for or indication
of respect for human dignity, hence consent's justificatory force
in our culture, but what if that designation is mistaken?
The "informing for decision" model does not imply limits on
what may be consented to."s To mark off certain practices and
experiments as per se prohibited requires going beyond inform-
ing for decision, beyond merely guaranteeing an information-rich
180 Annas, The Hospital, supra note 131, at 13. See also In re President & Dirs. of
Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1010, 1016-17 (D.C.Cir. 1964) (Burger, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing) (interpreting Brandeis' famous "right to be let
alone" as including "a great many foolish, unreasonable and even absurd ideas
which do not conform, such as refusing medical treatment even at great risk").
' Goldstein, supra note 90, at 693-94. See also George J. Annas, Breast Cancer:
The Treatment of Choice, in JUDGING MEDICINE, supra note 55, at 36, 38 (arguing
that self determination does not require that patients be informed; they may opt out
of receiving information).
182 Katz, Informed Consent, supra note 89, at 174.
18. See Goldstein, supra note 90, at 695-96 (noting that although there may indeed
be such limits, state may not impose their observance).
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space for choice, free from second-guessing. However, our ethic
of public life and personal relations is constructed around a be-
lief in the justifying force of consent. We are reluctant to limit
consensual activity, not only because we-positively-respect
consent, but because we-negatively-do not know what other
notions to turn to. If we trim consent's power, even with the
purpose of guarding human dignity, what do we have left?
The next part of this Article discusses human experimenta-
tion in a way which allows us to prohibit or condemn immoral
experiments or experimenters, without deconstructing the sub-
jects' rationality and autonomy. Consent might still be the unal-
terable ground rule-the necessary condition for a moral
experiment-but it is a rule supplemented by others, as was the
case with the Nuremberg Code. And one of these rules might be
that some experiments may not be consented to, not because
something is wrong with the subject, but because something is
wrong with the experiment."8
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE ETHIcs OF AUTONOMY
We have previously established that the Standard Model of
informed consent is at best a subterfuge; it fails both to protect
research subjects from harmful experiments-assuming they
need protection-and to promote the dignity of the human per-
son.' 5 Most research poses no problems and is easily legitimated
and justified, but the subject's consent to those experiments is
not by itself a reliable indicator that they are justified, nor is it
itself what justifies them.
It is clear that we sometimes limit consensual activity. Al-
though some of these limits are controversial,1 86 many are not.
Why and when do we interfere? It is a complicated problem.
Limits on the power to consent may sometimes reflect our judg-
ment about a particular activity or choice, but they may also
184 In a very different context, Professor Stephen Schwarcz, discussing the taking
and granting of security interests in body parts, put the issue very nicely: "[Tihe
threshold question is whether such security interests should be permitted. That is-
sue transcends commercial law. Only when that issue is resolved can one begin to
address how to create and perfect the security interest ...." Stephen L. Schwarcz, A
Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private Legislatures,
29 GA. L. REV. 909, 945 (1995) (emphasis added).
185 See supra notes 109-184 and accompanying text.
186 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state law prohib-
iting consensual sexual activity).
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speak to the relationships and contexts in which these activities
and choices occur."' And the reasons given for interfering with
consent, with autonomy, matter a great deal. Think back to the
critique of the Standard Model of informed consent: By refusing
to allow an experiment-by interfering with a private prefer-
ence-we either degrade the would-be subject by questioning the
quality of his consent,' or respect him, by accepting his consent
at face value. But we can also respect the subject-and our-
selves-by forbidding the experiment outright; whether our
prohibition reflects respect or not depends on why we interfere
with his choice. The immediate and strident objection, however,
is that idealistic harangues about the insufficiency of consent as
a justification for experiments are odiously paternalistic. There-
fore, before discussing the possibility of dignity-protecting re-
strictions on consent to human experimentation, we should
ventilate this paternalism objection.
A. Beyond Paternalism
A restriction on the power of consent is paternalistic "if the
sole justification for imposing it is to promote or protect the in-
dividual's own welfare (or happiness or good)."'89 Given our cul-
ture's dedication to the force of consent, our "master concept,"
and to autonomy, the paternalism objection is a forceful one. If a
limit on consent, say, to human experimentation, is
"paternalistic" and is therefore inimical to the dignity of persons,
then the ostensible reason for the limit, to protect dignity, col-
lapses and the limit is unjustified.9 '
187 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1138-39 (providing various reasons for interfer-
ences with private preferences); see also Cass Sunstein, Disrupting Voluntary
Transactions, in MARKETS AND JUSTICE, NOMOS XXXI, 279 (John W. Chapman & J.
Ronald Pennock, eds., 1989).
"" See Isaiah Berlin, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 137 (1969) (suggesting that to in-
terfere with autonomous choice of individuals is to "deny their human essence, to
treat them as objects without wills of their own, and therefore to degrade them").
89 See ANTHONY KRONMAN & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT
LAW 254 (1979); see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089, 1113-14 (1972) (distinguishing paternalism from rules based on "God's inter-
est" because paternalism implies "looking after the interests of the other party.");
Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1171 (noting that "the troublesome nature of
[paternalism] ... stems from the fact that the government is claiming to know better
than the individual whether a particular course of action will serve that individual's
interests"); see generally PATERNALISM (Rolf Sartorius ed. 1983).
... It is not clear, however, that all forms of paternalism are inconsistent with re-
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John Stuart Mill railed against paternalism, 9' and we have
since followed his lead. The case against paternalism was elo-
quently stated by Justice Brandeis:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their lib-
erty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk
in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding. 192
Brandeis' warning strikes a nerve in our cultural conscious-
ness; not withstanding its ubiquity in our institutions,'93 we are
hostile to paternalism.'
This hostility to paternalism is evident in the controversy
over human experimentation. For example, in the debate over
experimental AIDS treatment and research,'95 activists and pa-
tients insist, "Give us the drugs! Do the research! We'll take the
risks!" In their view, "the subject is respected best not by pro-
tection against research risks but by ensuring freedom of choice
and participation in research."9 ' The plight of persons with
AIDS demands that we explain and justify why we insist on pro-
tecting those who would, if permitted, refuse our protection."'
spect for persons. As Professor Kronman has discussed, we are really faced with
several forms of paternalism, each motivated by different concerns. See generally
Kronman, supra note 178, at 765. In this essay, I criticize the paternalism that sub-
stitutes the judgment of one for the judgment of another on the ground that the one
perceives the other's own interest differently, and would not have made the other's
choice had he been in the other's position. This form of paternalism is the type I see
lurking beneath the standard model of informed consent.
191 Mill insisted that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant." MILL,
supra note 18, at 68.
192 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
193 See Kronman, supra note 178, at 795 ("Our legal system restricts contractual
freedom in many ways and for many reasons."); Sunstein, supra note 6 at 1173
("[S]ignificant dangers lie in any approach that would treat private preferences, as
expressed in markets, as exogenous variables".). But see, Duncan Kennedy, Dis-
tributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference
to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 624-49
(1982) (defending paternalism against claim that it is inconsistent with legal order).
'9 On our deep distrust of paternalism, see generally David L. Shapiro, Courts,
Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 U. VA. L. REV. 519 (1988).
'95 See supra note 44.
'9 Mariner, supra note 44, at 291.
197 Recall the discussion of limits on prisoners' ability to participate in research,
despite their own wish to do so and their quite rational expectations of personal
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These persons also rightly demand more by way of justification
than our patronizing insistence that they have mistakenly calcu-
lated their own interests and that we know what is best for
them.
How do we move the debate beyond paternalism? What does
a commitment to human dignity and respect for persons require?
The Standard Model is no help here; it is itself incurably pater-
nalistic, when it rises above being a ritualistic fairy tale.19 The
Standard Model assumes it can shepherd misguided subjects to
their truer, more autonomous selves.'99 But many limits on pri-
vate preferences do not require us to unpack consent or re-
evaluate others' choices. There are non-paternalistic motivations
and reasons for limiting opportunities to consent, or for curtail-
ing consent's justification force.
For example, in the context of AIDS research, as in any hu-
man experimentation context, "the first and most important
question is whether the experiment should be done at all."2 °°
Only after this question is answered should we ask about con-
sent. The framework for AIDS research and other experimenta-
tion must be defined in objective and not subjective terms. As
one commentator put it, "[tihe applicability of ethical principles
should not depend on the participants' willingness to have them
apply in any particular case ... [t]his cannot depend on the sub-
ject's willingness to take particular risks any more than a per-
son's agreement to be a slave justifies slavery."20 ' Thus, in Kai-
mowitz, the issue should not have been whether the decision to
undergo the surgery was or was not "rational."2 2 It may have
benefits. See generally supra notes 107-30 and accompanying text.
'" See e.g., Katz, Informed Consent, supra note 89, at 140 ("Medical law in the
United States is a clear case of institutionalized paternalism.").
"9 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1141-42 (arguing that interferences with private
preferences are justified when aimed at producing more autonomous choice, free
from influence of ignorance, bad habits, or patriarchal rules).
See Annas, Faith, supra note 44, at 778; see also United States v. Rutherford,
442 U.S. 544 (1979) (denying exception to FDA rules for terminally ill cancer pa-
tients seeking Laetrile for treatment).
201 Mariner, supra note 44, at 295 ("Society always labels some risks... unaccept-
able").
'02 After a lengthy analysis of the three elements of informed consent: (1) Disclo-
sure to patient of information necessary to make an intelligent decision; (2) Pa-
tients's knowledge of the risk involved; and (3) A voluntary choice by the patient,
the court held that an involuntary detained mental patient can not give an informed
and valid consent to experimental psychosurgery. Kaimowitz v. Dep't of Mental
Health for the State of Mich., reprinted in 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 147, 150-
51, 153 (1976) (emphasis added). However the court added that a mental patient
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been. However, other factors-Doe's status as a prisoner, the
novelty of the technique, the sacredness of the brain, human
dignity-dictate that his consent may not serve as blanket
authorization to proceed in good conscience."' We should limit
Doe's ability to consent, or more precisely, Doe should not even
be asked for his consent, to protect ourselves from participating
in a bad act. Because psychosurgery is intrinsically incompatible
with a respect for human persons, the focus is not to insure that
Doe acts within what we perceive to be his best interest. We
should worry about the behavior of the experimenter, about our
own culpability, and not about the subject's choosing capacities.
Such restrictions on consent, which aim at objective behav-
iors and results rather than at subjective decision-making proc-
esses, are common in the criminal law. For example, guilty pleas
must usually be supported by a factual basis, and be knowing
and voluntary." We recognize that defendants might quite ra-
tionally plead guilty to crimes they did not commit and that
prosecutors might be willing to accept such pleas. °5 However,
because such pleas embroil the legal system in a monstrous
falsehood, we refuse to accept them while admitting that they
might indeed be in the defendant's correctly perceived best inter-
ests.
In Newton v. Rumery, °' the Supreme Court reversed a lower
court's decision that a "release-dismissal agreement," by which
Rumery agreed to release any claims he might have against the
Town in exchange for the prosecutor dropping pending charges
against him, was unenforceable as a violation of public policy.2 '
The Court noted that in many cases, such agreements reflect a
reasoned and rational decision that the very tangible benefits of
could give informed consent to an accepted psychosurgical procedure. Id. at 153
(emphasis added).
203 Burt, supra note 47, at 34.
204 See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f) (requiring inquiry into factual basis of plea); see
also John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Vol-
untary Pleas But Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88, 89 n.6 (1977) (listing
numerous state statutes with some form of factual basis requirement); see generally
Bonnie, supra note 184, at 1369-80 (discussing how factual basis requirement serves
interests of both society and defendant).
205 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (approving plea despite defen-
dant's insistence that he was innocent "in view of the strong factual basis for the
plea"); see generally Barkai, supra note 204, at 96-7 (discussing possible reasons fac-
tually innocent defendants might decide to plead guilty).
480 U.S. 386 (1987).
207 Id. at 392-97.
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avoiding prosecution outweigh the more speculative hopes of a
civil judgment. °" In dissent, Justice Stevens insisted that,
[the examination of the agreement] cannot end with the obser-
vation that respondent made a knowing and voluntary choice to
sign a settlement agreement. Even an intelligent and informed,
but completely innocent, person accused of crime should not be
required to choose between a threatened indictment and trial ...
and surrendering the right to a civil remedy ....
This is because "the important federal interests in providing
a remedy for the violation of constitutional rights and in having
the merits of such claims resolved openly" outweigh the interests
in enforcing such agreements.21 °
201 Id. at 394.
209 Id. at 403 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
210 Id. at 418-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Contrast Justice Stevens' approach with
the Court's "next friend" jurisprudence in "volunteer" death penalty cases. The
Court has generally assumed that the only question is whether the defendant is
competent to make his own decision. In fact, capital defendants often refuse to fight
their executions. See, e.g., Abraham Kwok & Pamela Manson, Brewer is Executed,
1st Lethal Injection Given in Arizona, ARIZONA REPUB., March 3, 1993, at Al
(quoting condemned prisoner, "I just don't think I deserve to live. I killed."); see gen-
erally Jane L. McClellan, Comment, Stopping the Rush to the Death House: Third
Party Standing in Death Row Volunteer Cases, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 201, 213-16 (1994)
(discussing death penalty volunteers' motives to waive appeals); Welsh S. White,
Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 871-75 (1987) (discussing
psychological factors and motives which influence inmates to choose death). For the
most part, courts accept these decisions, barring some demonstration of the defen-
dant's near-insanity. See, e.g., Brewer v. Lewis, 997 F.2d 550, 561-63 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting from failure to grant en banc review); Demosthenes v.
Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 734-36 (1990) (holding defendant was competent to waive re-
view); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("next
friend" doctrine does not apply where defendant has knowingly waived right to pro-
ceed). The problem is that the defendant's choice to accept execution may cause
tangible harm to third parties, or may result in a death sentence, which has not
been properly adjudicated, being carried out despite legal or constitutional flaws.
For example, in both Whitmore and Gilmore, the death sentences were never ap-
pealed.
Gary Gilmore's case is the most famous and perhaps poignant example of the
harm caused by voluntary execution. Gilmore's sentence may have been unconstitu-
tional, but was never appealed. Gary Gilmore's mother Bessie Gilmore attempted
and failed to challenge Gilmore's death sentence. Gilmore, 429 U.S. 1012. The Court
focused on her technical standing to present her claims, arguably ignoring the real
and unfolding human drama. Id. at 1014-16. "They also left a red handknit shawl
with her, and fluffy house slippers to keep her feet warm. Somehow, they had never
got around to talking of Bessie's case in the Supreme Court." MAILER, supra note 8,
at 732.
For fuller treatment of the issues that arise when a defendant-and a cli-
ent-chooses death, see Bonnie, supra note 179, at 1391 (1988) (insisting that "the
law's duty to respect individual dignity is heightened, not diminished, when choices
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Similarly, in contract and consumer law, we often balance
our general preference for unfettered respect for consensual ar-
rangements against other concerns."' Some of these concerns
may be paternalistic, aimed at protecting one of the parties from
disregarding his or her own interests; but they may also aim at
increasing systemic efficiency or societal respect for human dig-
nity.212 Of course, the aims of any given limit on a person's abil-
ity to consent to an act, or to contract, are probably mixed. A
nonwaivable warrant of habitability, the prohibitions of con-
tracts of slavery or peonage, of agreements purporting to waive
the right to obtain a divorce, of many provisions requiring spe-
cific performance, the voidability of contracts made by infants,
and the nonwaivable "cooling off' period imposed by consumer
law in many transactions-all of these apparent anomalies in
our generally consent-driven law are motivated both by paternal-
istic and other concerns."' One purpose of these rules is unde-
niably to substitute the supposedly better judgment of the
legislature and the judiciary about what is really in a person's
best interest.214  Therefore, to the extent that we disapprove of
paternalism, we may dislike these rules. But another purpose of
these rules is to protect third parties or to vindicate larger social
goals, without inquiring at all into the "real" interests or capaci-
ties of the regulated parties.1 5
Whether a given limit is paternalistic or something else may
be only a question of perspective. Maybe we require a non-
are made in the shadow of death"); White, supra at 855-61 (noting dilemma faced by
defense attorneys when client decides to accept execution).
211 For example, under § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a court may de-
clare a contract "unconscionable" and thus refuse to enforce its terms. Likewise, in
an attempt to protect the consumer, many provisions of the sales law alter the exact
nature of the transaction: warranties are implied (§ 2-314, § 2-315), and a mer-
chant's ability to exclude the implied warranties is limited (§ 2-316, § 2-317).
SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES (West 1994).
212 See generally KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 189, at 253-61; Kronman, supra
note 183.
212 See Kronman, supra note 178, at 764 (stating that some limitations seek to
protect moral and economic interests as well).
214 See, e.g., James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking
the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1431 (1994) (stating that legis-
latures might use substituted-judgment framework to decide which child-rearing
decisions should reside with state and to settle disputes involving proposed medical
care for mentally retarded adults).
215 See Kronman, supra note 178, at 765 (stating that some paternalistic limita-
tions on contractual freedom can be explained by considerations of economic effi-
ciency and distributive fairness).
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waivable warrant of habitability because we think that some
people might foolishly agree to bad housing to save a few dollars,
or perhaps we, as a community, do not want our goal of decent
housing stock to be stymied by purely self-interested transac-
tions.21 We interfere even as we remain agnostic about whether
a waiver would be in those people's self-interest.
The Nuremberg Code explicitly recognized the need to place
non-paternalistic limits on the scope of experiments. 17 The Code
asks more of an experiment, a researcher, or society than mere
consent.218 There are nine other principles, at least some of
which must be considered before consent is even solicited.19
Whether someone consents to an experiment which fails to meet
the criteria set forth in the rest of the Code is irrelevant; if he
does not consent, then any experiment is undeniably wrong.
However, if he does consent to the experiment, this consent alone
will not justify it.22° Importantly, though, it is not the ability or
"right" of the subject to consent which is questioned by such an
approach. What is being questioned are the situations when
questions of consent are relevant.
Preferences may be, and often are, limited for non-
paternalistic reasons. Paternalism may conflict with human
dignity, but so does the Standard Model of informed consent.
Thus, the following sections approach the questions of how and
whether to limit the efficacy of consent to human experimenta-
tion from three different but related points of view. All three
approaches are non-paternalistic and embody a richer notion of
human dignity and of human flourishing than those notions
implicit in the Standard Model of informed consent.
B. A Triadic Approach
The Standard Model works through the "socially sanctioned
216 Id. at 764 (noting that such provisions in a residential lease may have paternal-
istic or non-paternalistic purpose).
217 See generally Annas, Mengele's Birthmark, supra note 45, at 20 n.12 (listing
Nuremberg Code's legal requirements for experimentation on humans).
218 See, e.g., id. (listing requirements of Code that experiments be conducted only
by scientifically qualified persons and that adequate facilities are provided and
proper preparations made for experiments).
Id. at 21.
220 See id. at 20-21; Edmond Calm, Drug Experiments and the Public Conscience,
in EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 50, at 721 (discussing factors, other than subject's
capacity to choose, which might render consent to experiment morally ineffective).
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dyad" of experimenter and subject.2"' The former seeks the con-
sent of the latter; the whole affair looks nicely contractual and
free. Conveniently, the arrangement is the kind that our legal
system understands-the usual litigation paradigm, a conflict
between two disputants advancing opposing interests. 2 But this
picture is not appropriate in experimentation cases; these cases
are instead "triadic."" There is a third interest-our inter-
est-in preserving human dignity in our community. In the
Standard Model, this third interest-the "silent, but influential
and omnipresent participant 22 -is ignored. However, we non-
subjects are interested parties, and we either "suffer or benefit
from experiments or from the failure to perform [them]."225
How can we, as bystanders, take our place at the table, and
convert the dyad into a triad? Think of limits on the justifying
power of consent as a proxy for our involvement in the experi-
mentation decision. We cannot always be there to insure that
degrading, consensual experiments do not occur, so we preemp-
tively voice our opposition through limits. These limits on con-
sent are not imposed as ad hoc and particularistic reactions to
the troubling facts in a particular case, as when consent is given
by a person with diminished capacities. Instead, they represent
a systematic intervention and reflect a system-wide concern that
we, as interested parties, are being excluded from the table
where decisions that affect our community and its values are
being made.
Strictly speaking, of course, we do not insert ourselves into
the conversation between researcher and subject so much as we
preclude certain conversations from taking place. Under the
"triadic" approach, we do not allow subjects' consent to be solic-
ited for degrading experiments, not because we worry that the
subjects are incapable of consenting rationally, but because we
have decided that the experiments should not occur, that certain
22' Burt, supra note 47, at 26.
222 Id. at 29 (criticizing court's approach in Kaimowitz).
22 Id. at 25, 29-34. In Burt's paper, he identifies the three points of the "triad" as
researcher, subject, and reviewing court, and questions whether this triad is up to
the task of regulating psychosurgery. Id. at 25. I have replaced the third point-the
court-with all of us, who have an interest in insuring that our community is one in
which dignity is respected. See Pope Pius XII, supra note 59, at 91 (listing and
weighing interests of science, patient, and community in medical research).
224 Burt, supra note 47, at 29.
22' See Walter Modell, The Ethical Obligations to the Nonsubject, in EXPERI-
MENTATION, supra note 50, at 723.
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relationships ought not to be created. Through our surrogate in-
trusion into the experimental dyad, we bridge the wide divide of
social, emotional, and moral distance between ourselves and the
two nominal parties to the transaction,226 and we protect our-
selves from complicity in the degradation of human persons." 7
C. A Constitutional Approach: "Self-Paternalism"
This related but distinct perspective begins from the idea of
"self-paternalism. " 22 We behave self-paternalistically when we
limit ourselves in the short run to vindicate another, long-term
commitment.29 The classic example is Odysseus lashing himself
to the mast of his ship so that the Sirens' song would not entice
him to their island. When generalized from the individual's
standpoint to that of a society, self-paternalism is really
"constitutionalism.""0 Laws often reflect a society's "preferences
226 Burt, supra note 47, at 34. Some might suggest that the IRBs effectively per-
form the function of surrogate for our interests in the triad. But given the institu-
tional ties between the IRBs and researchers, and the IRBs' place in the dignity-
defeating Standard Model of informed consent, they are simply not up to the job.
22' The goal of protecting ourselves as a community from complicity in degradation
should be distinguished from a goal of promoting the "rights of the community" to,
for example, protect people from themselves, or save itself from paying the financial
costs of experiments gone awry. In Tennessee v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 113 (Tenn.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976), the court acknowledged the pull of religious
freedom, but held that "snake-handling" as part of a religious ritual was a nuisance.
It stated:
Tennessee has the right to guard against the unnecessary creation of wid-
ows and orphans. Our state and nation have an interest in having a strong,
healthy, robust, taxpaying citizenry capable of self-support and of bearing
arms and adding to the resources and reserves of manpower. We, there-
fore, have a substantial and compelling state interest [in prohibiting snake-
handling]....
Id. What I am suggesting in this essay is not that we need to throw more "rights"
into the mix, but that we should not let the ethics of autonomy and consent thwart
our commitments to relationships predicated on respect for human dignity.
2u See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 12
(1985) (explaining that self-paternalism is forcing yourself to do what is best for
yourself); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS (rev. ed. 1984); Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 189, at 1113-15 (distinguishing between self-paternalism and
true paternalism); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1140-45 (discussing voluntary foreclo-
sure of consumption choices by majority); Bailey Kuklin, Self-Paternalism in the
Marketplace, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 649 (1992) (explaining consumer's use of self-
paternalism as device to protect herself from unavoidable disadvantage in market-
place); Jonathan Schonsheck, Deconstructing Community Self-Paternalism, 10 LAW
& PHIL. 29 (1991).
= CALABRESI, supra note 228, at 12.
2o When the theory of self-paternalism is extended to society, one has to posit a
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about preferences,"' and its decision to voluntarily foreclose fu-
ture choices. Our Constitution is an example.2 ' Because the
framers knew the dangers of policy based on emergency and ex-
pediency, and the occasional attractiveness of utility-based or
even bigotry-based action, it made sense to prospectively limit
what government could do to us and what we could do to each
other and ourselves. 33 In a way, our constitutional rights reflect
our "second-order preferences" 3 4 about the conduct of future
majorities. 35
Importantly, "constitutionalism" is neither convenient nor
cost-free. Requiring the government to pay "just compensation"
when it takes and uses our property, 3 1 that punishments be hu-
mane and proportional,3 and that police and prosecutor restrain
their zeal in the face of an endless parade of obviously guilty de-
fendants and public outcry about crime is very inconvenient.238
But we have lashed ourselves to a constitutional ideal, fearing
how we might react in future perceived emergencies. In so do-
ing, we have "recognize[d] [our] inherent weaknesses and
[sought] to compensate for them by means of a Constitution ...
our insulation from our baser selves."2 9
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of excessive and dis-
proportional punishment embodies this strong sense of constitu-
tional self-paternalism. Through this amendment, "We The
unanimous citizenry agreeing to bind themselves from future mistakes. If only the
majority wishes to bind itself, the minority are coerced. See Schonsheck, supra note
228, at 35, 48; Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1141-42.
231 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1140.
232 KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 189, at 258-59 (anti-slavery rules may be jus-
tified because they offend Constitutional values).
23 See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2434 (1992) ("[Tlhe Constitu-
tion protects us from our own best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns
and among branches of government precisely so that we may resist the temptation
to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the
day."); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1141 ("The majority is seeking to bind itself, and
the legal system is the best way to accomplish that task.").
234 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1140. Second order preferences are "preferences
about preferences," or conscious choices of preferences, by the majority because it
disapproves of some conduct. Id. at 1140-41.
235 See id. at 1141; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-1
(1978).
236 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
231 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
23' U.S.. CONST. amend. WV.
29 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 345 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(discussing Eighth Amendment's limitations).
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People" have expressed our commitment to a society free from
human degradation:?"° "[Olur Constitution is not grounded in
sympathy for those who would commit crimes of violence, but in
concern for the society that diminishes itself whenever it takes
the life of one of its members."24' Under the Eighth Amendment,
it is not just that the criminal defendant has a claim or right
against society, but that we have bound ourselves against doing
certain things to defendants.242 The Eighth Amendment clearly
reflects its drafters' foresight and desire to restrain both them-
selves and those who followed.243 Because the amendment is a
self-directed command, and not just a defendant's personal
right,2" the defendant may not waive it. 245 No defendant could
ever meaningfully consent to an Eighth Amendment violation;
after all, who is he to demand that we violate our moral com-
mitments?46 We cannot accept such consent.2 1
" See Furman, 408 U.S. at 297 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Today we reject public
executions as debasing and brutalizing to us all.").
241 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 899 (Cal. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958
(1972).
212 See Stephen A. Blum, Public Executions: Understanding the "Cruel and Un-
usual Punishments" Clause, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 449-50 (1992)
(discussing that Eighth Amendment should not be viewed as personalized protection
forprisoner).
See id. at 438-54; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (noting
that Framers believed 'power might be tempted to cruelty"); Furman, 408 U.S. at
320 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Patrick Henry's warnings that "no latitude
ought to be left nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives" since they may
use some pretense to introduce harsher punishments).
24 See Blum, supra note 242, at 449 ("Eighth Amendment decisions revolve not
around the punished but around the punisher.").
' See Linda E. Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use
of Court-Appointed Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Ad-
vocates Death, 55 TENN. L. REV. 95, 128 (1987) ("Limits on an individual defendant's
ability to waive constitutional rights are warranted when society's interests are bal-
anced against those of the defendant.").
'" Justice Holmes commented, "Just as the original punishment would be im-
posed without regard to the prisoner's consent and in the teeth of his will, whether
he liked it or not, the public welfare, not his consent, determines what shall be
done." Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927). See also Commonwealth v.
McKenna, 383 A.2d 174, 180-81 (Pa. 1978) (given societal interests, defendant can-
not waive rights to determination that his death sentence is constitutional). But see
Bonnie, supra note 179, at 1384-91 (suggesting that societal interests underlying
Eighth Amendment might not outweigh defendant's right to consent to his execu-
tion).
141 "The moral impossibility is on the other side, our side. It is we who cannot ac-
cept certain consents that are ostensibly free and voluntary; it is we who are unable
to accept a profit from human sacrifice." Cahn, supra note 220, at 721; see also
West, supra note 7, at 399 (noting that consensual-but-degrading relations are dam-
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Categorical limitations on human research and experimen-
tation, like limits on police power, unavoidably slow us down and
may have unfortunate and bitterly resented results.2 4' For ex-
ample, we might never learn a great deal about children's dis-
eases and health. Many might die of AIDS who would otherwise
be willing to take risks on the slight chance that the next miracle
drug might really work. We also might not certainly know that a
certain gas mask will protect our soldiers overseas. But these
losses might be-like the occasional guilty defendant going
free-a price worth paying. The question is not so much whether
we can afford to honor our commitment to human dignity, free
from subterfuges like the Standard Model of informed consent,
but whether we can afford not to, or whether we ought to.
249
Thus, we limit consent's effect in human experimentation
because, like Odysseus, we doubt our ability to stand firm in the
face of the Sirens' song. The lure of perfectionism and of the all-
consuming pursuit of knowledge, both the conceit and the curios-
ity of the scientist, all conspire to tempt us to play fast and loose
with the dignity of our research subjects and ourselves. To pre-
vent ourselves from self-betrayal, we lash ourselves to the ideal
of respect for persons, concretely embodied in objective and non-
waiveable side-constraints in human experimentation.250 The
ideals by which we limit our research are "the product of our own
moral self-image, our enduring convictions and our social con-
p251
science.
D. The Inalienability of Our Dignity
The third approach is essentialist or teleological. Because of
what it means to be a person, because of our ideal of human
flourishing, and because we recognize certain acts, which de-
grade human dignity, as inherently inimical to our ideal, we
aging to autonomy and that "ilt is immoral to participate in such consensual trans-
actions and immoral for the community to tolerate them.").
'" "I must acknowledge that research in psychosurgery will most likely be slowed,
perhaps by decades, by barring access to these experimental subjects. That is an
important social cost of my conclusion." Burt, supra note 47, at 34.
9 See Jonas, supra note 22, at 228 ("Society ... cannot 'afford' a single miscarriage
of justice, a single inequity in the dispensation of its laws, the violation of the rights
of even the tiniest minority, because these undermine the moral basis on which so-
ciety's existence rests.").
25 See Burt, supra note 47, at 34.
251 Cahn, supra note 220, at 721.
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prohibit them directly.252 Because it would simply be wrong to do
certain things, consenting to having those things done to oneself
does not, and cannot, justify them.253 We lack the power to jus-
tify anti-human acts by our consent.
Pope Pius XII once told researchers that:
[T]he Patient cannot confer rights he does not possess ... the
decisive point is the moral licitness of the right a patient has to
dispose of himself. Here is the moral limit to the doctors' ac-
tion[s].2
That is, the dignity of one's personhood is inalienable. The
recent Catechism of the Catholic Church expands on this idea. 5
Although the value and usefulness of science is acknowledged
and embraced,256 this utility does not and cannot provide the
guiding moral principles for research.257 Rather, the "dignity of
the person" is the inviolable norm governing human experimen-
tation:
Research or experimentation on the human being cannot legiti-
mate acts that are in themselves contrary to the dignity of per-
sons and to the moral law. The subjects' potential consent does
not justify such acts.2"
In a similar vein, one commentator wrote, in the midst of the
abolition debates, that "[t]o say that by committing the folly or
the crime of contracting to do an immoral act a man lays himself
under a moral obligation to do that immoral act is to overturn
252 Of course, there is the danger that the imposition of a community's ideal of
human flourishing on a dissenter effectively violates the Kantian noninstrumentali-
zation principle, and uses the dissenter as a means to the community's end. See
Schonsheck, supra note 228, at 43 n.15.
25 See Marcia Angell, Editorial Responsibility: Protecting Human Rights by Re-
stricting Publication of Unethical Research, in THE NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 44, at
278 ("[Informed consent cannot transform an inherently unethical experiment into
an ethical one.").
2' See Pope Pius XII, supra note 59, at 92.
255 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2292-96 (1994) [hereinafter
CATECHISM] (explaining respect for persons when dealing with scientific research).
25e Id. at §§ 2292-94 ("Science and technology are precious resources when placed
at the service of man and promote his integral development for the benefit of all.").
See also POPE PIUS XII, supra note 59, at 91 (emphasizing intrinsic value of scien-
tific knowledge).
27 See CATECHISM, supra note 255, at § 2294.
211 Id. at § 2295. This passage also notes that experimentation that takes place
without the subject's informed consent is per se a violation of human dignity. In-
formed consent is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Id.
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the very foundations of morality."59 It is not that we paternalis-
tically limit otherwise justifying consent, but rather that consent
in these instances is intrinsically limited.26 ° The would-be con-
senter is morally powerless.
This third approach seems to capture the heart of the Nur-
emberg Code, its "deep theory," shrouded over by years of hag-
gling about informed consent. After all, the focus at Nuremberg
was not on the lack of consent given by the Nazis' victims, but on
the horrific aspects of the acts themselves.26 ' The very purpose of
the trial, General Taylor said, was "as the voice of humanity, [to]
stamp these acts, and the ideas which engendered them, as bar-
barous and criminal."6 2 To focus on consent as the lesson of
Nuremberg, and to identify consent as the primary locus for
moral concern in human experimentation, misses the point. One
commentator has said:
It would be a moral understatement to conclude that the Nazi
experiments were wrong because voluntary, informed consent
was not obtained from the subjects .... Two fundamental ethical
principles were simultaneously violated: the prohibition against
inflicting suffering on human beings and the Kantian categori-
cal imperative prohibiting the use of persons as mere means to
the ends of others.2
This third approach also sounds in the American historical
tradition. After all, we ringingly proclaimed to the world the
existence of certain "inalienable" rights: Life, liberty, and the
21 Anonymous, Has Slavery in the United States a Legal Basis?, 2 MASS. Q. REv.
147 (1848).
260 Immanuel Kant, LECTURES ON ETHICS 165 (L. Infield trans., J. MacMurray rev.
ed. 1930).
Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a thing; he is not his
own property; to say that he is would be self-contradictory; for in so far as
he is a person he is a Subject in whom the ownership of things can be
vested, and if he were his own property, he would be a thing over which he
could have ownership. But a person cannot be a property and so cannot be
a thing which can be owned, for it is impossible to be a person and a thing,
the proprietor and the property.
Id.; see also George Hegel, Philosophy of Right 29 § 66 (T.M. Knox trans. 1952)
(arguing that alienation of personhood is "contradiction").
261 See General Telford Taylor, Opening Statement of the Prosecution, December 9,
1946 in THE NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 44, at 68 ("The mere punishment of the de-
fendants ... can never redress the terrible injuries which the Nazis visited on these
unfortunate peoples. For them it is far more important that these incredible events
be established by clear and public proof.").
262 Id.
263 Macklin, supra note 78, at 254-55.
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pursuit of happiness.2 This third approach prohibits alienation
of one's human dignity; it prohibits acts inconsistent with a re-
spect for persons and with our ideal of human flourishing.
What do we really mean when we say our dignity is "inalien-
able?"265 Much has been written about the inalienability of cer-
tain rights, holdings, entitlements, etc.26 For some, problems
with externalities or the costs of monitoring certain classes of
transactions justify, for efficiency reasons, blocking those trans-
actions altogether.267 Here, however, we are after something
deeper. Our dignity is inalienable not because of the inefficien-
cies and costs of alienability,2 68 not as a preemptive and paternal-
istic blocking of classes of transactions we think people are likely
to conduct rashly, but because it is inalienable, because that is
what being a person means. As one writer put it, restrictions on
alienability prevent undue "commodification" of persons.269 The
Standard Model of informed consent, and the ethics of autonomy,
dissect our persons into salable or marketable attributes, explod-
ing the unitary vision27° of the person to whom dignity attaches
as a person, the vision which alone gives autonomy any worth.'
Of course, an opponent of the idea that there are limits on
the ability to consent to experimentation might argue, "I have no
legal moral obligations towards myself; and whatever I do to my-
self I do to a consenting party."271 2  With this rationale, the
24 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
261 See Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y
179, 185 (1986) ("To characterize a right as inalienable is to claim that the consent
of the right-holder is insufficient to extinguish the- right or to transfer it to anoth-
er.").
266 For an interesting collection of essays on problems of market justice and hu-
man dignity, see NOMOS XXXI: MARKETS AND JUSTICE (John W. Chapman & J. Ro-
land Pennock, eds. 1989).
267 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property
Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931-32 (1985) (arguing for a broad-based approach
to inalienability which allows for possible restrictions); Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 189, at 1093 (stating that economic efficiency is reason for allocating of enti-
tlements).
26 Note that not all of these costs are economic. The costs from harm to our
"moralisms" are very real and, some argue, justify inalienability rules by them-
selves. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 189, at 1111-12.
269 See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1852
(1987).
270 Id. (noting that "inalienability negates the possibility of separation" of a right
from its holder).
271 Id. at 1885.
272 See J.M. Finnis, Legal Enforcement of "Duties to Oneself': Kant v. Neo-
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autonomous agent who consents to a dignity-thwarting experi-
ment affects only himself and is insulated from meddlesome ex-
ternal criticism. He has the capacity and right "to exercise
rational autonomy in choosing and revising his ends, whatever
they are."27 After all, his ends, his own ideal of human flourish-
ing, may include living on the edge, taking risks, doing whatever
it takes to acquire scientific knowledge.
Our response should be to insist that the respect due an
agents' autonomy derives from our conceptually prior respect for
humanity and its dignity: "[Olne has autonomy just in so far as
one does in fact make one's choices, not on the basis of one's in-
terests, but out of respect for the demands of morality."274 The
requirement that we respect humanity in others derives from the
same universal moral law which requires that we respect hu-
manity in ourselves.275 In Kantian terms, we must not make
ourselves a mere means for others, but instead, always treat our-
selves as ends for others.27 And so, when we try to dissuade, or
even prevent, others from "evil forms of life," such as debasing
experiments, we do so not only because they are failing in a duty
to themselves-although they are-but because they are
thwarting "the community's effort of reducing those evils and of
maintaining forms of life more conducive to authentic human
flourishing."77 Consequently, this argument connects nicely with
the constitutional argument.278 "Duties to self' are really just
individual and particularized instances of broader duties to pro-
tect and promote human dignity, and may be enforced by the
community as part of its commitment to the good life.
Kantians, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1987). Radin notes that liberal pluralists, and ad-
vocates of the ethics of autonomy, tend to view inalienability rules as paternalistic.
Radin, supra note 269, at 1887-88.
273 Finnis, supra note 272, at 439 (citing D. Richards, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND
THE LAW 9 (1982)).
274 Id. at 441.
275 Id. at 445.
276 Id. at 450 (citing Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice 236
(John Ladd trans. 1965)).
277 Id. at 456. On the importance of an ideal of human flourishing, see Radin, su-
pra note 269, at 1851 (noting that "we should evaluate inalienabilities in connection
with our best current understanding of the concept of human flourishing."); see also
West, supra note 7, at 427 (arguing that we must judge our institutions by "moral
value of the human personality they engender"); see generally A. MACINTYRE, AFrER
VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984) (presenting and defending virtue-based notion of eudaemonia,
or "human flourishing.").
278 See supra text accompanying notes 228-251.
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Thus, the "antipaternalist's" charge is incoherent. The pro-
hibition of certain experiments derives not from paternalism, but
from a universally applicable moral rule protecting human dig-
nity and respect, and is therefore no more paternalistic than the
prohibitions against theft and murder. When we say that hu-
mans may not be commodified, that essential attributes and fea-
tures of the human person may not be alienated, that human
dignity exists, and is subject to harm, above and apart from its
particular manifestations in individuals, we are not exercising
paternalistic judgments about the authenticity of a person's
judgment. We are simply following moral rules derived from an
ideal of human flourishing. The "antipaternalist" objections to
dignity-based limits on consent's justifying power are, in the end,
"the product[s] of the lonely-individual doctrine in philosophical
ethics. ,279
VI. RIGHT RELATIONSHIPS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION
The history of medical research on humans is a story of tri-
umphs and abuses. 80 This Article has suggested that the abuses
are due, in part, to our misplaced belief in and reliance on the
justificatory power of consent, reflected in the Standard Model of
informed consent." I have suggested that although informed
consent claims to respect autonomy and therefore human dig-
nity, it fails on both counts. The Standard Model deconstructs
our choices and preferences, thereby exposing our autonomy as a
plastered-over menagerie of addictions, habits, and insecuri-
ties.2' At the other end, the Standard Model rests on a shallow
and unsatisfactory conception of human dignity, on an atomistic
and lonely ethics of autonomy. The Standard Model is a suc-
cess only in that it serves as a subterfuge, as a means of allowing
us to profess a commitment to autonomy while at the same time
pursuing our scientific ambitions and curiosities." But such
subterfuges, while comforting and perhaps even psychologically
279 Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV.
963, 987 (1987).
280 See supra text accompanying notes 37-52.
281 See supra notes 94-95.
282 See supra text accompanying notes 177-80.
m See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
2" See supra note 180-82 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 175-76.
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necessary, are necessarily unstable.286
So why do we believe consent can justify when it is so clear
that we consent to what is otherwise unjustifiable all the time?
Why does consent have so much moral power; why do we often
allow it to trump our other concerns?287 It was suggested at the
beginning of this Article that our reliance on consent may reflect
a weary resignation to the normlessness of modern life.2" In a
time of so much oppression, we grab at consent as a marker of
better relations; we follow it like a signpost pointing the way to
our ideal of relations based on equality and respect."9 We are all
moral relativists now; we do not know what moral laws or uni-
versal principles we could point to that would tell us which and
when human experiments were unethical. But if subjects con-
sent, we tend to believe that they are not being misused, that
they have been allowed to act in an autonomous way. This is
tragic, but maybe it is the best we can do. But make no mistake,
the ethics of autonomy is an ethics of the second-best.
In a wonderful article on the moral force of consent, Profes-
sor Robin West describes the moral worlds of Judge Richard
Posner, whom West reads as a strong proponent of consent's
justificatory side,290 and Franz Kafka. For Posner, both auton-
omy and social utility are best served if we organize the world
around respect for consent.29' In Kafka's world, wretched per-
sons in nightmarish societies consent to and get what they think
they want, and are miserable.292 In Professor West's view, Pos-
ner's characters use consent as a vehicle for the pursuit of eco-
nomic gain and self-actualization, while Kafka's seek and crave
authority and relationships of domination.9 '
2816 See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 26, at 18-19 ("[T]he detail of the pattern
of tragic choices is movement .... Like the arch, tragedy never rests.").
287 See West, supra note 7, at 386 ("consent is a moral trump").
288 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
289 As Jay Katz puts it, we cling to informed consent as a "symbol" of respect.
Katz, Informed Consent, supra note 91, at 138-39. See also Calabresi, supra note 27,
at 403-05 (questioning whether consent is adequate indicator of decency).
m"Posner's argument depends ... on an explicit assumption that the presence of
consent, ... satisfies the requirements of an ideal of autonomy." West, supra note 7,
at 385-86.
29 Id. at 385 (claiming that Posner argues that moral values are furthered by
wealth-maximizing market transfers where all affected parties have given consent).
"Posner infers from these assumptions that the more acts of consent ... that the le-
gal system allows ... the better off and more autonomous we will all be." Id. at 386.
22 Id. at 386-87, 395-400, 406-11, 417-22.
293 Id. at 386-87.
WHY INFORMED CONSENT?
We can learn from Kafka. If we use consent because we
think it a marker of relations based on equality and respect for
human dignity,294 we are mistaken. If the goal of our moral
thought and lives is to attain or at least hope for such relations,
consent is an insufficient vehicle. We are not simply "choosers,"
as the ethic of autonomy and consent posits. We are members,
friends, and loved ones as well. The Standard Model ignores this
fact, for it requires people who can be described without relation-
ships.295 It is no wonder then that the informed consent model
fails to protect our dignity. It does not understand what we are.
Perhaps we now have the beginnings of an answer. We have
given consent justificatory power in human experimentation and
in other contexts because, on the positive side, it is all we have
and we know that consent is better than coercion. On the darker
side, consent is a convenient subterfuge which allows us both to
profess a commitment to dignity and autonomy and to do the re-
search science and progress require. But what we are really af-
ter through our reliance on consent are relationships of equality
and respect for human dignity. Perhaps, then, a shift in focus
from the consent and state of mind of the subject and the re-
searcher to the quality and characteristics of the relationships in
which the experiment takes place will help us make better moral
judgments about experimentation.29
Importantly, this focus on relationships neatly unifies the
three perspectives, discussed above, on dignity-based limitations
on consent's justifying power. A triadic, rather than dyadic, view
of the experimentation transaction more accurately reflects the
relationships running through and around the transaction. Our
self-paternalistic, constitutional commitments are to rightly-
I owe this thought to Professor Robert Burt.
See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS
AND THEIR COMMUNITIES 13-21 (1991) (stating that we must consider relationships
in our dealings with others because there are things about persons that are more
interesting than choices they make); Shaffer, supra note 279, at 965-79 (stating that
organic communities of persons are prior in life and in culture to individuals); Tho-
mas L. Shaffer & Mary M. Shaffer, Character and Community: Rispetto as a Virtue
in the Tradition of Italian-American Lawyers, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 838, 839
(1989) (arguing that human person is not simply product of his choices-"we belong"
to organic communities first, and then "we choose").
See William J. Curran, Book Review, Medical Research on Human Subjects, 92
YALE L.J. 577, 580-81 (1983) (criticizing Levine's presentation of standard model of
informed consent as insufficiently attuned to importance of relationships and con-
text).
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ordered relationships, in which equality, respect, and personal
dignity are nurtured and protected. Our ideals of human flour-
ishing which dictate that our dignity is inalienable should reflect
the fact that we are beings who live in context, who live in rela-
tionships. We are not lonely automatons, but belongers; we
flourish in rightly-ordered relationships.
Therefore, before deciding how much justifying force to give
consent, we ought to assess the quality of the relationship which
emerges or results from the proposed transaction."' When we
experiment on prisoners, persons dying of AIDS, or children,
what kinds of relationships are we creating and exploiting?298 In
these relationships, in which we observers are also invisible
participants, are all parties seen and regarded as equals? Are all
respected as human persons? The desperate person dying from
AIDS who is willing to undergo any experiment for the slightest
chance of survival may well be able to consent intelligently and
autonomously, and our refusal to participate may well block the
exercise of his autonomy, but it may also reflect our commitment
to certain kinds of relationships and to a morality whose essen-
tial experience is not the act of consent. When we tell Doe that
we will not perform psychosurgery on him, we should do so not
because he cannot consent, but because the relation between
state and prisoner has already strained our commitment to
equality and human dignity. We do not care if Doe consents be-
cause our concern is that his consent would produce a relation
even further from our ideal.299
297 See West, supra note 7, at 423-24 ("An assessment of the moral value of that to
which we ... consent must include an assessment of the relationship flowing from
the transaction .... [Clonsent ... may have good or evil consequences, depending
upon the ... moral quality of the relationship ... that our consent nurtures."); Radin,
supra note 269, at 1904 (arguing for an ideal of human flourishing based on
'contextuality" and noting that "[i]n order to be autonomous individuals, we must at
least be able to act for ourselves through free will in relation to the environment of
things and other people.").
m See Burt, supra note 47, at 34 (insisting that we should not allow psychosur-
gery in prison "until everyone could see that the operation would not increase the
distance, the gulf, the differences, between the prison population and the rest of
us").
m See Burt, supra note 10, at 15 (discussing tension between criminal law and
commitment to equal respect among persons, and noting in particular that death
penalty is "flamboyantly visible proclamation that all social relations between victim
and oppressor ... have been irreversibly severed"); see also West, supra note 7, at
395, 409 (noting that community's failure to respond to consent-driven human deg-
radation is "moral failure" by that community, and "breakdown of community and
WHY INFORMED CONSENT?
Ms. Eva Mozes-Kor, a survivor of Mengele's experiments on
twins, wrote:
[Ihf a human being is ever used in the experiments, the scien-
tists must make a moral commitment never to violate a person's
human rights and human dignity ... The scientists of the world
must remember that the research is being done for the sake of
mankind and not for the sake of science; scientists must never
detach themselves from the humans they serve."
This is the correct approach. We must be committed to re-
lations of nondetachment-precisely the opposite of the relations
produced by a mistaken fidelity to consent's justificatory side, to
the atomistic, separated, lonely ethics of autonomy."0 ' A hollow
and specious commitment to autonomy which looks only for con-
sent and then robs consent of its moral force when the results of
autonomy are for any reason unacceptable does not honor the
lessons of Nuremberg and of the ongoing history of human ex-
perimentation. In the context of human experimentation at
least, we must place objective limits on what we permit our-
selves to do to each other, limits that remind us to look at the
relationships we create in our political and social lives.0"
EPILOGUE: FAITH AND HOPE
This Article has made several references to religious sources
and authorities, which I think were both appropriate and helpful
supports for the discussion. But these references suggest some-
brotherhood").
m Eva Mozes-Kor, The Mengele Twins and Human Experimentation: A Personal
Account, in THE NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 44, at 53, 58. See also CATECHISM, supra
note 255, at § 2293 ("Science and technology are ordered to man, from whom they
take their origin and development; hence they find in the person and in his moral
values both evidence of their purpose and awareness of their limits.").
"' See Ann Althouse, Standing, in Fluffy Slippers, 77 U. VA. L. REV. 1177 (1991)
(discussing how Court mistakenly viewed Gary Gilmore, from Norman Mailer's The
Executioner's Song, in isolation, apart from complex social relationships his execu-
tion affected); SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note 295, at 880 ("An anthropology of
rights ... seems always to depend on the premise that the human person is funda-
mentally alone.").
30 See Richard John Neuhaus, The Way They Were, The Way We Are: Bioethics
and the Holocaust, FIRST THINGS, March, 1990, at 36.
A rabbinical dictum has it that we should 'place fences around the law.'
The idea is that restraints and prohibitions should be in place to prevent
us from reaching, or at least impede our progress toward, the point of abso-
lute and damning transgression. There should at least be safety rails
around the abyss.
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thing else as well. For persons living in a community of faith,
the normlessness of radical individualism may weigh less heav-
ily, because there is an alternative..3 " Not only may faith help
provide content to the ideals of human dignity and flourishing, it
may help implement this ideal in practice.
If the ideal of our moral life is a world of relations which re-
spect and promote human dignity, where justice is not only
transactional but consists, as Plato saw, of rightly-ordered rela-
tionships, then faith permits us to hope that our God will par-
ticipate in our relations with each other, and that God also
desires and respects the dignity of persons. Our faith may also
teach us that our failure to protect and promote others' dignity,
and our excusing of our complicity in inhumanity through reli-
ance on consent, is not merely bad policy but a sin.3" In the end,
we just do not know how to best promote and value human dig-
nity. Perhaps, this side of Heaven, we can only aim at our ideal.
303 In other contexts, Professor Thomas Shaffer has written a great deal about the
competing claims of radical individualism and faith communities. See Shaffer, supra
note 279, at 986-91; SHAFFER & SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR
COMMUNITIES, supra note 295, at 196-217; THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE
PROFESSIONS (1987).
3o See West, supra note 7, at 411 ("Excusing one's own inhumanity by protecting
the freedom of the loser to suffer is ... a type of sin.").
